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Abstract 
This paper presents the main findings of a quantitative evaluation of the Red de 
Protecci￿n Social (RPS), a conditional cash transfer program in Nicaragua, against its 
primary objectives.  These included supplementing income to increase household 
expenditures on food, reducing primary school desertion, and improving the health care 
and nutritional status of children under age 5.  The evaluation design is based on a 
randomized, community-based intervention with measurements before and after the 
intervention in both treatment and control communities.  Where possible, we erred on the 
side of assessing effects in conservative manners, for example, in the calculation of 
standard errors and the treatment of possible control group contamination.  Overall, we 
find that RPS had positive (or favorable) and significant double-difference estimated 
average effects on a broad range of indicators and outcomes.  Where it did not, it was 
often due to similar, smaller improvements in the control group that appear to have been 
stimulated indirectly by the program.  Most of the estimated effects were larger for the 
extreme poor.  The findings presented here played an important role in the decision to 
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1.  Introduction 
In recent years, increasing emphasis has been placed on the importance of human 
capital in stimulating economic growth and social development.  Consequently, investing 
in the human capital of the poor is widely seen as crucial to alleviating poverty, 
particularly in the long term.  There is also growing recognition of the need for social 
safety nets to protect poorer households from poverty and its consequences during the 
push for economic growth (World Bank 1997).  While at first glance stimulating 
economic growth and investing in social safety nets are apparently different strategies for 
economic development, both are important.  They are also potentially complementary, as 
effective social safety nets may directly contribute to economic growth via improved 
human capital, particularly in the long term (Morley and Coady 2003). 
Consistent with this view, several Latin American countries have introduced 
programs that integrate investing in human capital with access to a social safety net.  One 
reason for the growing popularity of these programs is that by addressing various 
dimensions of human capital, including nutritional status, health, and education, they are 
able to influence many of the key indicators highlighted in national poverty reduction 
strategies.  One of the first, and largest, programs was the Programa Nacional de 
Educaci￿n, Salud y Alimentaci￿n (PROGRESA) in Mexico, begun in 1997.  Another 
large program is the Programa de Asignaci￿n Familiar (PRAF) in Honduras.  This paper 
examines a third, the Nicaraguan Red de Protecci￿n Social (RPS) or ￿Social Safety Net.￿ 
The primary objective of these programs is to generate a sustained decrease in 
poverty in some of the most disadvantaged regions in their respective countries.  Their 
basic premise is that a major cause of the intergenerational transmission of poverty is the 
inability of poor households to invest in the human capital of their children.  Supply-side 
interventions, which increase the availability and quality of education and health services, 
are often ineffective in resolving this problem, since the resource constraints facing poor 
households preclude them from incurring the private costs associated with utilizing these 
services (e.g., travel costs and the opportunity cost of women￿s and children￿s time).  2 
These programs attack this problem by targeting transfers to the poorest communities and 
households and conditioning the transfers on actions intended to improve children￿s 
human capital development.  This effectively transforms cash transfers into human 
capital subsidies for poor households. 
Modeled after PROGRESA, RPS is designed to address both current and future 
poverty via cash transfers targeted to households living in poverty in rural Nicaragua.  
The transfers are conditional, and households are monitored to ensure that children are, 
among other things, attending school and making visits to preventive health-care 
providers.  When households fail to fulfill those obligations, they lose their eligibility.  
By targeting the transfers to poor households, the program alleviates short-term poverty.  
By linking the transfers to investments in human capital, the program addresses long-run 
poverty.  RPS￿s specific objectives include 
•  supplementing household income for up to three years to increase expenditures on 
food, 
•  reducing school desertion during the first four years of primary school, and 
•  increasing the health care and nutritional status of children under age 5. 
RPS comprised two phases over five years, starting in 2000.  The pilot phase (also 
known as Phase I) lasted three years and had a budget of $11 million, representing 
approximately 0.2 percent of GDP or 2 percent of annual recurring government spending 
on health and education (World Bank 2001, annex 21).  As a condition of the Inter-
American Development Bank (IADB) loan financing the project, and to assess whether 
the program merited expansion in the same or in an altered form, the Government of 
Nicaragua solicited various external evaluations of Phase I.  The International Food 
Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) conducted the quantitative impact evaluation, using a 
randomized community-based design.  In late 2002, based in part on the positive findings 
of the various evaluations, the Government of Nicaragua and IADB agreed to an 
expansion of the program for three more years with a budget of $22 million. 3 
This paper presents the principal findings from the impact evaluation of RPS for a 
broad range of outcomes related to the program￿s objectives, including (1) household 
(food) expenditures, (2) child schooling and child labor, (3) preventive health care of 
children under age 5, and (4) nutritional status of children under age 5.  Though they are 
widely used and have a long history in developed countries, rigorous, large-scale, 
randomized evaluations of social programs such as the one reported on here remain rare 
in developing countries (National Research Council 2001; Newman, Rawlings, and 
Gertler 1994).  Such studies have been increasing in popularity recently, however, after 
the widely cited case of PROGRESA (Skoufias 2003). 
2.  Design and Implementation of the Red de Protecci￿n Social 
To analyze how a complex program like RPS altered behavior, it is first necessary 
to describe the program￿s operation and evolution. 
Program Targeting 
In the design phase of RPS, rural areas in all 17 departments of Nicaragua were 
eligible for the program.  The focus on rural areas reflects the distribution of poverty in 
Nicaragua￿of the 48 percent of Nicaraguans designated as poor in 1998, 75 percent 
resided in rural areas.  For the pilot, the Government of Nicaragua selected the 
departments of Madriz and Matagalpa from the northern part of the Central Region, on 
the basis of poverty as well as on their capacity to implement the program.  This region 
was the only one that showed worsening poverty between 1998 and 2001, a period during 
which both urban and rural poverty rates declined nationally (World Bank 2003).  In 
1998, approximately 80 percent of the rural population of Madriz and Matagalpa were 
poor, and half of those were extremely poor (IFPRI 2002).  In addition, these departments 
had easy physical access and communication (including being less than a one-day drive 
from the capital, Managua, where RPS is headquartered), relatively strong institutional 
capacity and local coordination, and reasonably good coverage of health posts and 4 
schools (Arcia 1999).  By purposively targeting, RPS avoided devoting a 
disproportionate share of its resources during the pilot to increasing the supply of 
educational and health services. 
In the next stage of geographic targeting, all six (out of 20) municipalities that had 
the participatory development program Microplanificaci￿n Participativa (Participatory 
Micro-planning), run by the national Fondo de Inversi￿n Social de Emergencia (FISE), 
were chosen.
1  The goal of that program was to develop the capacity of municipal 
governments to select, implement, and monitor social infrastructure projects such as 
school and health post construction, with an emphasis on local participation.  It is 
possible, then, that the selected municipalities had atypical capacity to carry out RPS.  
Nevertheless, in terms of poverty, the six municipalities were well targeted.  Between 36 
and 61 percent of the rural population in each of the chosen municipalities were 
extremely poor and between 78 and 90 percent were extremely poor or poor (IFPRI 
2002), compared with national averages of 21 and 45 percent, respectively (World Bank 
2003).  While not the poorest municipalities in the country (or in the chosen departments 
for that matter), the proportion of impoverished people living in these areas was still well 
above the national average. 
In the last stage of geographic targeting, a marginality index based on information 
from the 1995 National Population and Housing Census was constructed, and an index 
score was calculated for all 59 rural census comarcas
2 in the selected municipalities.  The 
index was a weighted average of the following set of poverty indicators (with respective 
weights in parentheses) known to be highly associated with poverty (Arcia 1999): 
1.  family size (10 percent), 
2.  access to potable water (50 percent), 
                                                 
1 The six were Totogalpa and Yalag￿ina municipalities in the department of Madriz, and Terrabona, 
Esquipulas, El Tuma-La Dalia, and Ciudad Dar￿o municipalities in the department of Matagalpa. 
2  Comarcas are administrative areas within municipalities that include between one and five small 
communities averaging 100 households each. 5 
3.  access to latrines (30 percent), and 
4.  illiteracy rates (10 percent). 
Higher index scores were associated with more impoverished areas.  Recognizing 
that the index could not reliably distinguish between two comarcas with similar scores, 
rather than use the scores directly, the 59 rural comarcas were grouped into four priority 
levels after renormalizing the highest index score to 100:  a score of above 85 was given 
highest priority (priority 1); 70￿85, priority 2; 60￿70, priority 3; and below 60, lowest 
priority, 4.
3  The 42 comarcas with the priority scores 1 and 2 were eligible for the pilot 
phase￿s first stage. 
Program Design 
RPS has two core components: 
1.  Food security, health, and nutrition.  Each eligible household receives a cash 
transfer known as the bono alimentario or ￿food security transfer,￿
4 every other 
month, contingent on attendance at educational workshops held every other 
month and on bringing their children under age 5 for scheduled preventive (or 
well child) health-care appointments.  The workshops are held within the 
communities and typically include about 20 participants.  They educate women in 
household sanitation and hygiene, nutrition, reproductive health, breastfeeding, 
and related topics. 
To ensure adequate supply, RPS trained and paid private providers to 
deliver the specific health-care services required by the program.  These services, 
provided free of charge to beneficiary households, include growth and 
                                                 
3 IFPRI (2002) describes RPS targeting in more detail. 
4 One common definition of food security is ￿when all people at all times have both the physical and 
economic access sufficient to meet their dietary needs in order to lead a healthy and productive life￿ 
(USAID 1992).  In this paper, we do not formally assess food security, however, but focus on indicators of 
food expenditures that are associated with food security. 6 
development monitoring, vaccination, and provision of antiparasites, vitamins, 
and iron supplements.  Children under age 2 are seen monthly and those between 
2 and 5, every other month.  In practice, mothers bring their children to the local 
service location (often a community center or house of one of the beneficiaries) to 
be seen by the doctor working for the private provider.  First, the professional 
nurse measures the child, inquires about the child￿s health and the caretaker￿s 
caring and feeding practices, and checks the vitamin A supplementation record.  
Then the doctor examines the child, prescribing appropriate antiparasite medicine 
or iron supplements according to the Ministry of Health protocol for making these 
prescriptions.  If the child is growing well, the doctor congratulates the caretaker.  
Then the caretaker returns to the nurse to receive individual counseling on how to 
maintain or improve growth with key messages on breastfeeding, child feeding, 
illness care, and hygiene, taking into account several factors, such as the age of 
the child and whether the child gained weight adequately the previous month or 
had been ill.  The RPS adapted the individual counseling material from the 
Atenci￿n Integral a la Niæez (Integrated Attention to the Child, or AIN) program 
in Honduras (Van Roekel et al. 2002). 
2.  Education.  Each eligible household receives a cash transfer known as the bono 
escolar or ￿school attendance transfer￿ every other month, contingent on 
enrollment and regular school attendance of children ages 7￿13 who have not 
completed fourth grade of primary school.  Additionally, for each eligible child, 
the household receives an annual cash transfer intended for school supplies 
(including uniforms and shoes) known as the mochila escolar or ￿school supplies 
transfer,￿ which is contingent on enrollment.  Unlike the school attendance 
transfer, which is a fixed amount per household regardless of the number of 
children in school, the school supplies transfer is for each child. 
To provide incentives to the teachers, who have some additional reporting 
duties and were likely to have larger classes after the introduction of RPS, and to 7 
increase resources available to the schools, there is also a small cash transfer, 
known as the bono a la oferta or ￿teacher transfer.￿
5  This is given to each 
beneficiary child, who in turn delivers it to the teacher.  The teacher keeps one-
half, while the other half is earmarked for the school.  The delivery of the funds to 
the teacher is monitored, but not their ultimate use. 
Table 1 summarizes the eligibility requirements and demand and supply-side 
benefits of RPS.  At the outset, nearly all households were eligible for the food security 
transfer, which is a fixed amount per household, regardless of household size (Appendix 
A describes the small number of households that were not eligible).  Households with 
children ages 7￿13 who had not yet completed the fourth grade of primary school were 
also eligible for the education component of the program. 
The amounts for each transfer were initially determined in U.S. dollars and then 
converted into Nicaraguan c￿rdobas (C$) in September 2000, just before RPS began 
distribution.  Table 1 shows the original U.S. dollar annual amounts and their Nicaraguan 
c￿rdoba equivalents (using the September [2003] average exchange rate of C$12.85 to 
US$1).  The food security transfer was $224 a year, and the school attendance transfer 
$112.
6  On its own, the food security transfer represents about 13 percent of total annual 
household expenditures in beneficiary households before the program.  A household with 
one child benefiting from the education component would receive additional transfers of 
                                                 
5 In rural Nicaragua, school￿s parents￿ associations often request small monthly contributions from parents 
to support the teacher and the school; the teacher transfer was, in part, intended to supplant those informal 
fees. 
6 The calculations for the transfer amounts were based on the extreme poverty gap, i.e., the difference 
between the extreme poverty line and the average level of expenditures of the extreme poor reported in the 
1998 LSMS (World Bank 2001).  The 1998 daily per capita extreme poverty line (calculated to enable the 
purchase of a minimum requirement food basket) is $0.58 and the extreme poverty gap, $0.18.  For 
comparison, the 1998 daily per capita poverty line is $1.12.  The amount for the school attendance transfer 
was calculated using an approximation of the opportunity cost of children multiplied by the average 
number of children ages 7￿13 in households in extreme poverty.  The sum of the food and school 
attendance transfers was an estimated average daily transfer of $0.12, an amount that would fill two-thirds 
of the average extreme poverty gap for extremely poor households. 8 
Table 1￿Nicaraguan Red de Protecci￿n Social (RPS) eligibility and benefits in the pilot 
phase 
  Program components 
  Food security, health, and nutrition  Education 
ELIGIBILITY    
  Geographic targeting  All households
a All  households
a with children ages 7-13 
who have not yet completed fourth 
grade of primary school 
DEMAND-SIDE BENEFITS     
  Monetary transfers  Bono alimentario 
(food security transfer) 
Bono escolar 
(school attendance transfer) 
  CS2,880 per household per year (US$224)  C$1,440 per household per year (US$112)
  
Mochila escolar 
(school supplies transfer) 
    C$275 per child beginning of school year 
(US$21) 
SUPPLY-SIDE BENEFITS     
Services provided and 
monetary transfers 
Bimonthly health education workshops   
  Child growth and monitoring   
    -Monthly (0-2 year olds) 
  -Bimonthly (2-5 year olds) 
Bono a la oferta 
(teacher transfer) 
    (C$60 per child per year given to 
teacher/school (US$5) 
  Provision of antiparasites, vitamins, and 
iron supplements 
 
  Vaccinations (0-5 year olds)   
a As described in Appendix A, a small percentage of households were excluded. 
 
about 8 percent, yielding an average total potential transfer of 21 percent of total annual 
household expenditures.  Over the two years, the actual average monetary transfer 
(excluding the teacher transfer) was approximately C$3,800 (or 18 percent of total annual 
household expenditures).  This is approximately the same percentage of total annual 
household expenditures as the average transfer in PROGRESA, but more than five times 
as large as the transfers given in PRAF.  In contrast to PROGRESA, which indexes 
transfers to inflation, the nominal value of the transfers remained constant for RPS, with 
the consequence that the real value of the transfers declined by about 8 percent over two 
years in the pilot phase due to inflation.  It is possible that any differences in the 
effectiveness of RPS between 2001 and 2002 resulted, in part, from a decline in the real 
value of the transfers, though such effects are likely to be small. 
The value of the supply-side services, as measured by how much RPS paid to the 
providers, was also substantial.  On an annual basis, the education workshops cost 9 
approximately $50 per beneficiary and the health services for children under age 5, 
approximately $110, including the value of the vaccines, antiparasites, vitamins, and iron 
supplements, all of which were provided by the Ministry of Health. 
To enforce compliance with program requirements, beneficiaries did not receive 
the food or education component of the transfer if they failed to carry out any of the 
conditions listed in Table 2.  The monitoring is done using the management information 
system (MIS) designed specifically for and by RPS.  It comprises a continuously updated, 
relational database of beneficiaries, health-care providers, and schools.  The MIS is also 
used to (1) select beneficiaries and prepare invitations to program incorporation 
assemblies, (2) calculate transfer payments, (3) compile requests to the Ministry of 
Health for vaccines and other materials, and (4) monitor whether service providers are 
meeting their responsibilities.  Decision rules capturing the requirements in Table 2 are 
programmed directly into the MIS.  Substantial time was dedicated to designing data 
forms for the various program participants that feed into this system (including the 
household registry or census forms, school forms, and health-care provider forms that are 
all sent to the main office where they are entered into the computer). 
Table 2 shows the four different ￿types￿ of beneficiary households in the 
program, who receive different transfers and have to fulfill different requirements.  
Households with no children in the targeted age ranges are only eligible for the food 
security transfer but, at the same time, need only attend the health education workshops 
to qualify for continued receipt of the transfers.  Households with children under age 5 
(but without children ages 7￿13 who have not completed the fourth grade) are also 
eligible for the food security transfer only, but have more requirements to fulfill related to 
their young children.  Households with children ages 7￿13 who have not completed the 
fourth grade are eligible for both the food security and education transfers and are 
required to comply with the school-related conditions.  If, in addition, there are children 
under age 5 in the household, it is eligible for the same transfers, but has more 
requirements to fulfill, in particular, those related to the health controls for young 
children. 10 
Table 2￿Nicaraguan Red de Protecci￿n Social (RPS) beneficiary co-responsibilities 
monitored by Phase I 













children ages 7-13 who 
have not completed 
fourth grade 
(C)  (B) + (C)
Attend bimonthly health education workshops             
Bring children to prescheduled health-care 
appointments        
  Monthly (0-2 years)           
  Every other month (2-5 years)         
Adequate weight gain for children under 5
a          
Enrollment in Grades 1 to 4 of all targeted children 
in the household          
Regular attendance (85 percent), i.e., no more than 
five absences every two months without valid 
excuse) of all targeted children in the household           
Promotion at end of school year
b          
Deliver teacher transfer to teacher           
Up-to-date vaccination for all children under 5 
years
b           
a The adequate weight gain requirement was discontinued in Phase II starting in 2003. 
b Condition was not enforced 
 
RPS allows this latter type of household to receive a partial transfer if it complies 
with the health-care requirements and not the education requirements or vice versa.  
During the first two years of transfers, approximately 10 percent of beneficiaries were 
penalized at least once and therefore did not receive, or received only part of, their 
transfer.  It was also possible for households to be expelled from the program.
7  At the 
start of the program, about 90 percent of the households in the intervention areas were 
participating (see Appendix A).  Less than 1 percent of households were expelled during 
the first two years of delivering transfers, though 5 percent voluntarily left the program, 
e.g., by dropping out or migrating out of the program area. 
                                                 
7 Causes for expulsion include (1) repeated failure to comply with program requirements, (2) failure to 
collect the transfer in two consecutive pay periods, (3) more than 27 unexcused school absences during the 
school year per beneficiary child, (4) failure of a beneficiary child to be promoted to the next grade, and (5) 
discovery of false reporting of information during any part of data collection, including information about 
fulfillment of program responsibilities. 11 
When it was learned that some, but not all, schools practiced automatic 
promotion, enforcement of the grade promotion condition was deemed unfair and 
therefore was never enforced.  Similarly, when there were some delays in the delivery of 
vaccines, the up-to-date vaccination condition was also deemed unfair and not enforced.  
A third condition, punishment of children who did not have adequate weight gain, was 
dropped at the end of the pilot phase because of a concern about the role of measurement 
error and the finding that the poorest households were more likely to be punished.  These 
changes highlight the importance of careful consideration of the required responsibilities 
and how they are to be monitored during the design of a conditional cash transfer 
program.  At the same time, they show the importance of flexibility during program 
implementation. 
Only the designated household representative could collect the cash transfers and, 
where possible, RPS designated the mother as the household representative.  This 
strategy mimics the design of PROGRESA and PRAF and is based on evidence that 
resources in the hands of women often lead to better outcomes for child well-being and 
household food security (Strauss and Thomas 1995).  As a result, more than 95 percent of 
the household representatives were women.  These representatives attended the health 
education workshops and they were responsible for ensuring that the requirements for 
their households were fulfilled.  In a small number of multigenerational households, the 
grandmother was selected as the household representative.  Since the workshops at times 
cover themes such as family planning, flexibility on who attends the sessions might be 
called for in this area. 
Although centrally administered, with its multisectoral approach across education, 
health, and nutrition, RPS required bureaucratic cooperation at national, municipal, and 
community levels.  Given funding and administrative oversight from FISE, municipal 
planning and coordination was conducted by committees composed of delegates from the 
health and education ministries, representatives from civil society, and RPS personnel.  
This coordination proved important in directing supply-side responses to increased 
household demand for health and schooling services.  At the comarca level, RPS 12 
representatives worked with local volunteer representatives known as promotoras 
(beneficiary women chosen by the community) and local school and health-care service 
providers, to implement the program.  The promotoras were charged with keeping 
beneficiary household representatives informed about upcoming health-care 
appointments for their children, upcoming payments, and any failures in fulfilling the 
conditions.  Each promotora had, on average, 17 beneficiaries in her charge, though this 
average masked substantial variation ranging from 5 to 30 beneficiaries. 
3.  Design of the Evaluation and Methodology 
The evaluation design is based on a randomized, community-based intervention 
with measurements before and after the intervention in both treatment and control 
communities.  One-half of the 42 comarcas (targeted in the first stage as described in the 
first portion of Section 2) were randomly selected into the program.  Thus, there are 21 
comarcas in the intervention group and 21 in the control group (IFPRI 2001a).  Including 
a control was ethical because the effectiveness of the intervention was unknown.  In 
addition, there was not sufficient capacity to implement the intervention everywhere.  
Given the geography of the program area, control and intervention comarcas are at times 
adjacent to one another.  The selection was done at a public event with representatives 
from the comarcas, the Government of Nicaragua, IADB, IFPRI, and the media present.  
The 42 comarcas were ordered by their marginality index scores and stratified into seven 
groups of six each.  Within each stratum, randomization was achieved by blindly drawing 
one of six colored balls (three blue for intervention, three white for control) from a box 
after the name of each comarca was called out.  Thus, three comarcas from each group 
were randomly selected for inclusion in the program, while the other three were selected 
as controls. 
The evaluation was designed to last for one year; that is, the control group was 
meant to be a control for only one year (after which it was expected there would be 
capacity to implement the intervention everywhere).  Due to delays in funding for RPS as 13 
a result of a governmental audit unrelated to the program, however, incorporation of 
beneficiaries in the control comarcas was postponed until 2003, extending the possible 
length of the treatment-control evaluation by more than a year.  In fact, control comarcas 
waited a little over two years before being fully incorporated into the program. 
Data Collection 
The data collected for the evaluation are from an annual household panel data 
survey implemented in both intervention and control areas of RPS before the start of the 
program in 2000, and in 2001 and 2002 after the program began operations.
8  The 
questionnaire was a comprehensive household questionnaire based on the 1998 
Nicaraguan LSMS instrument, expanded in some areas (e.g., child health and education) 
to ensure that all the necessary program indicators were captured, but cut in other areas 
(e.g., income from labor and other sources) to minimize respondent burden and ensure 
collection of high-quality data in a single interview.
9  An anthropometric module for 
children under age 5 was implemented in 2000
10 and 2002, but not in 2001.  In this 
module, we measured height (or length) and weight; we also measured hemoglobin using 
portable (Hemocue) machines and following standard international procedures. 
The survey sample is a stratified random-sample at the comarca level from all 42 
comarcas described above.  The areas represented comprise a relatively poor part of the 
rural Central Region in Nicaragua, but the sample is not statistically representative of the 
six municipalities (or other areas of Nicaragua, for that matter).  Forty-two households 
were randomly selected in each comarca using a census carried out by RPS three months 
prior to the survey as the sample frame, yielding an initial target sample of 1,764 
households.  The sample size calculation was based on assessing the necessary sample 
sizes for the indicators listed in Appendix B, Table 26.  Assuming a random sample, the 
                                                 
8 Results reported on here are based on the September 2003 release of the RPS evaluation data. 
9 LSMS surveys are typically implemented in two visits to the household (Grosh and Glewwe 2000). 
10 About one-half of the 2000 anthropometry survey had to be completed in early October, one month after 
the main survey, due to delays in getting all the necessary equipment and supplies for hemoglobin testing. 14 
indicator that required the largest sample size, using a significance level of 5 percent and 
a power of 80 percent, was enrollment for Grades 1￿4 (indicator 5 in Appendix B, Table 
26).  To detect a minimum, statistically significant difference of eight percentage points 
between intervention and control groups, a sample size of 549 students for each group 
was required.  Of course, not all households had children in this age group.  According to 
the 2000 RPS population census, 63 percent of households had at least one child between 
ages 6 and 12.  Therefore, to obtain a sample of 549 children (in different households), it 
was necessary to interview 871 households in each group (549 ￿ 0.63) or 1,742 in total.  
Thus, we arrived at a target sample of 1,764 households.
11  The first wave of fieldwork 
was carried out in late August and early September 2000, without replacement￿that is, 
when it was not possible to interview a selected household, another household was not 
substituted. 
While there was a great deal of progress in getting RPS started throughout 2001, 
it was not possible to design and implement all the components according to the original 
timelines.  In particular, the health-care component was not initiated until June 2001.  
This delay occurred because it took longer than originally planned to design the 
intervention and select, contract, and train the NGO and private health-care providers.  
There were also delays in the payment of transfers to households due to a governmental 
audit that effectively froze RPS funds.  As a result, the RPS 2001 follow-up survey was 
delayed until the beginning of October, to allow additional time for the interventions to 
take root and for five of the scheduled six payments to be effected.  Of course, the 
advantage of the original design, with the scheduled RPS follow-up at exactly the same 
time of year as in the 2000 baseline, was that it would enable us to control better for 
possible seasonal variations in consumption and health.  With a control group, however, 
the possible bias introduced by seasonality can be controlled for statistically.  This 
difference in the timing of the survey, then, does not present a serious problem for the 
                                                 
11 IFPRI (2001a) describes the sample size calculations in more detail and IFPRI (2001b and 2003) describe 
the baseline and follow-up samples in more detail.  Since anthropometric measures were not part of the 
original indicator list to be evaluated, they were not used in sample size calculations. 15 
estimation of average effects of the program.  The delay in the survey work had the 
advantage of giving the program more time to take effect, thereby providing a more 
realistic evaluation of program operations (rather than an evaluation of program delays).  
In October 2001, then, beneficiaries had been receiving transfers, and the educational 
components of the program had been monitored for 13 months, but they had only 
received five months of the health and nutrition services, including the health education 
workshops.  This unforeseen change in operations illustrates the importance of having a 
credible control group￿without the control, it would have been very risky to change the 
timing of the survey and still confidently attribute observed changes to RPS.  The 2002 
survey was also carried out in October, and in the second year, beneficiaries received all 
components of the program for a full 12 months. 
We now document nonresponse in the 2000 baseline survey and attrition in the 
follow-up surveys.  Overall, 90 percent (1,581) of the stratified random sample was 
interviewed in the first round (see Table 3).  In a handful of comarcas, the coverage was 
100 percent, but in six, it was under 80 percent.  For the follow-up surveys in October 
2001 and October 2002, the target sample was limited to these 1,581 first-round 
interviews.  In 2002, just over 90 percent of these were reinterviewed, on a par with 
surveys of similar magnitude in other developing countries (Alderman et al. 2001; 
Thomas, Frankenberg, and Smith 2001).  Again, however, coverage in six of the 
comarcas was substantially worse, with less than 80 percent successfully reinterviewed 
(and one of these is one of the six from above with high first-round nonresponse rate).  
This attrition is unlikely to have been random (a theme we return to later).  Because the 
same target sample was used in 2002 as in 2001, regardless of whether the household was 
interviewed in 2001, some households that were not interviewed in 2001 were 
successfully interviewed in 2002.  The sample for which there is a complete set of 
observations (one in each of the three survey rounds) is 1,396, smaller than the 1,434 
shown in the first row of the third column of Table 3.  The households are about evenly 
divided between intervention and control groups, indicating that at least the level of 
attrition was not significantly different between them. 16 
Table 3￿Nicaraguan Red de Protecci￿n Social (RPS) evaluation survey nonresponse and 
subsequent attrition 
  Baseline 2000  Follow-up 2001  Follow-up 2002 
Completed interview  1,581  1,490  1,434 
 (89.6)  (94.2)  (90.7) 
Completed interview in all three rounds  1,396  1,396  1,396 
 (79.1)  (88.3)  (88.3) 
  ...of which       
  Intervention  706  706  706 
    (percent intervention)  (80.0)  (87.2)  (87.2) 
  Control  690  690  690 
    (percent control)  (78.2)  (89.5)  (89.5) 
Not  interviewed     
  Uninhabited dwelling  60  51  83 
  Temporary absence  100  28  46 
  Refusal  16  6  12 
  Urban (misclassified)  6  0  0 
  Lost questionnaire  0  6  6 
Target sample  1,764  1,581  1,581 
Note:  Percent of target sample in parentheses. 
 
Issues Related to the Experimental Design 
To measure program impact, it is necessary to know what would have happened 
had the program not been implemented.  The fundamental problem, of course, is that an 
individual, household, or geographic area cannot simultaneously undergo and not 
undergo an intervention.  Therefore, it is necessary to construct a counterfactual measure 
of what might have happened had the program not been available.  The most powerful 
way to construct a valid counterfactual is to randomly select beneficiaries from a pool of 
equally eligible candidates.  This was done for the evaluation of RPS using a community-
based randomized intervention (IFPRI 2001a). 
The value of such randomized evaluations is widely recognized.  When done well, 
recipients and nonrecipients will have, on average, the same observed and, more 
important (since they are more difficult to control for), unobserved characteristics.  As a 
result, they establish a credible basis for comparison, freed from selectivity concerns, and 
the direction of causality is certain.  Nonrandomized approaches, on the other hand, 
typically rely on assumptions that are often hard to believe and almost always hard to 17 
verify (Burtless 1995).  A further advantage to a randomized design is that program 
impact is easy to calculate and, as a consequence, easier to understand and explain.
12 
However, even a well-implemented randomized evaluation design is not without 
its weaknesses.  First, the usual difficulties of following subjects over time persist, so 
selection bias due to attrition remains a potential problem; the advantages of 
randomization are dissipated with attrition if it is nonrandom.  Second, such studies can 
be costly (financially and politically), and often one must wait years for results, making 
them less useful for making pressing policy decisions.  Third, there are important ethical 
concerns about withholding treatment from the control group of an intervention known to 
have positive effects.  In RPS, the randomized design was justified because it had not 
been shown to have positive effects and because of the infeasibility, given the fixed 
budget, of extending the program to all potential beneficiaries in a short period of time.  
In this case, random selection would appear to be as fair as any other arbitrary criterion 
for selecting the first set of beneficiaries. 
Unfortunately, randomized design evaluations can provide only partial answers to 
important questions they are not explicitly designed to address.  This is often referred to 
as their ￿black box￿ nature.  The evaluation only allows us to assess the effect of the 
program (or program components) it was explicitly designed to assess.  In the case of the 
RPS evaluation, this means that we only evaluate the program as a whole, with all of its 
components.  Without further assumptions, we are in the dark if we want to consider how 
even slightly changing the program would alter the outcomes under consideration.  For 
example, RPS provides a ￿package￿ of services in which all households are eligible for 
the food security transfer, regardless of whether they also receive the educational 
transfers.  With only the randomized design implemented here, it is not possible to isolate 
                                                 
12 Heckman and Smith (1995), however, point out that this apparent simplicity can be deceiving, 
particularly in poorly designed evaluations where there is randomization bias (where the process of 
randomization itself leads to a different beneficiary pool than would otherwise have been treated) or 
substitution bias where nonbeneficiaries obtain similar treatments from different sources￿a form of 
￿contamination.￿  The former should not be a concern in the RPS evaluation.  We discuss the reasons for 
this later. 18 
the effects of just the educational transfer￿all the observed effects are the result of the 
program as a whole.  Nor is it possible, without further assumptions, to assess reliably 
what the effect of the program would be if the size of the transfers were to change, as 
they did when expansion of the program began in 2003. 
Another limitation of randomized evaluations is that the results pertain 
specifically to the study population￿extrapolating them to other populations requires 
additional assumptions that may not be easy to verify (Burtless 1995).  This is typically 
referred to as the external validity problem.  In the case of RPS, the purposive selection 
of program areas may have affected program performance; therefore the generalizability 
of the results is questionable.  As described earlier, the selection of municipalities was 
conditioned on the likelihood of success, so that the observed outcomes might exaggerate 
the likely outcomes from program expansion to other areas with, for example, weaker 
institutional capacity to implement the program. 
A final problem to bear in mind when interpreting the results in this analysis is 
that the program was in its pilot phase, and outcomes (and therefore estimated effects) for 
the pilot may differ from outcomes for an expanded program.  Like most pilots, RPS 
underwent an initial learning period (with attendant setbacks) and undertook a variety of 
activities that might not need repeating in an expansion (e.g., preparing training materials 
for beneficiaries, promotoras, and health-care providers).  Some of these activities could 
have reduced the program￿s effectiveness during the pilot (CaldØs and Maluccio 2004).  
Moreover, as with any new program, there was the potential for observed behavioral 
changes to result, in part from the novelty of the program or the evaluation rather than 
from permanent behavioral changes￿the Hawthorne effect (Krueger 1999).  There is 
some evidence consistent with this phenomenon when we compare the effects after one 
year (2000￿01) with those after two years (2000￿02).  Performance was slightly lower in 
2002 than in 2001 on several outcome indicators.  Unfortunately, we cannot directly test 
whether this is due to a Hawthorne effect, changes in the effectiveness of program 
implementation, or the slight decline in the real value of transfers.  Finally, expansion of 
the program could introduce new advantages and disadvantages associated with scaling 19 
up and economies of scale.  All these factors call for a degree of caution in forecasting 
what would happen were the program to be extended to other municipalities or 
departments of Nicaragua. 
Double-Difference Methodology 
Household- and individual-level data were collected in both the intervention and 
control comarcas before and after RPS was implemented.  This enables the use of the 
double-difference method to calculate ￿average program impact.￿
13  The resulting 
measures can be interpreted as the expected effect of implementing the program in a 
similar population elsewhere, subject to the caveats discussed above.  The method is 
shown in Table 4.  The columns distinguish between groups with and without the 
program (denoted by I for intervention and C for control), and the rows distinguish before 
and after the program (denoted by subscripts 0 and 1).  Anticipating one of the analyses 
presented below, consider the measurement of school enrollment rates for children.  
Before the program, we would expect the average percentage enrolled to be similar for 
the two groups, so that the quantity (I0 ￿ C0) would be close to zero.  After the program 
has been implemented, however, we would expect differences between the groups as a 
result of the program.  Furthermore, because of the random assignment, we expect the 
difference (I1 ￿ C1) to measure the effect directly attributable to the program.  Indeed, 
(I1 ￿ C1) is a valid measure of the average program effect under this design and is referred 
to as the first difference.  A more robust measure of the effect, however, would account 
for any preexisting observable or unobservable differences between the two randomly 
assigned groups:  this is the double difference obtained by subtracting the preexisting 
differences between the groups, (I0 ￿ C0), from the difference after the program has been 
implemented, (I1 ￿ C1). 
                                                 
13 Ravallion (2001) provides a useful and enjoyable discussion of this and related evaluation tools. 20 
Table 4￿Calculation of the double-difference estimate of average program effect 
Survey round  Intervention group 
with RPS program 
Control group 
without RPS program 
Difference across 
groups 
Follow-up  I1  C1  I1 ￿ C1 
Baseline  I0  C0  I0 ￿ C0 
    
Difference across time  I1 ￿ I0  C1 ￿ C0  Double-difference 
(I1 ￿ C1) ￿ (I0 ￿ C0) 
 
 
An alternative interpretation of the double-difference estimator emerges if one 
first considers the differences within the (intervention or control) groups.  This approach 
begins with a naive estimator of the program effect, the difference over time for the 
intervention group, (I1 - I0).
14  It is naive because it would include all changes over time 
in enrollment rates in the intervention group, regardless of what causes them.  For 
example, if increases in public investment nationally were improving school access and 
leading to changes in enrollment, these effects would show up in the difference over time 
in the intervention group, in addition to the effects attributable to the program.  The 
obvious measure for the nonprogram-related change over time in the intervention group 
is the change over time in the control group, (C1  - C0).  Thus we estimate the average 
program effect by first considering the total change over time in the intervention group, 
and then subtracting from this the change over time in the control group.  As above, this 
yields the double-difference estimator. 
The alternative interpretation is probably best illustrated graphically in Figure 1.  
For an arbitrary indicator that we measure over time, we assume (for the graph) that as a 
result of the randomization, both the intervention and control groups start at the same 
level.  No change in the indicator over time would lead to the outcome depicted by point 
A in 2002; if we were only following the intervention group, we would then naively 
calculate the effect of the program as C - A.  However, as the control group makes clear, 
                                                 
14 This approach is sometimes referred to as a ￿reflexive comparison.￿ 21 
there was a trend over time that led to an improvement (in this example) of B - A.  Were 
we to ignore this, we would overstate the effect of the program.  Instead, our estimate of 
the program effect is C - B; this is the double difference estimate.  In the case where the 
trend line for the control group was declining, ignoring that effect would tend to 
understate the program effect.
15 


















For this work, the technique just described is extended to account for the three 
measurements taken in 2000, 2001, and 2002.  The basic estimating equation is  
  Eict = α0 + α1 A1 + α2 A2 + α3 Pc + δ1A1 Pc + δ2 A2 Pc + µic + νict, (1) 
where 
Eict  =  outcome variable of interest for household (or individual) i in comarca c 
at time t, 
A1  =  (1) if Year 2001, 
A2  =  (1) if Year 2002, 
                                                 
15 Relaxing the (unnecessary) assumption that the two groups start at identical points slightly complicates 






Pc  =  (1) if program intervention in comarca c, 
µic  =  all (observed and unobserved) household- (or individual-) level time-
invariant factors, 
νict = unobserved  idiosyncratic  household  (or individual) and time-varying 
error, and 
all the α and δ are unknown parameters. 
The parameters of interest are δ1 and δ2; δ1 is the double-difference estimator of 
the average program effect for 2001 (relative to 2000), and δ2 for 2002 (relative to 2000).  
We emphasize that the program effects are identified by the randomized design; given the 
randomization of Pc, it (and any interactions involving it) is uncorrelated with all 
observed or unobserved household- (or comarca-) level variables so that the δs can be 
consistently estimated.  Indeed, the main reason to include household variables in a 
regression like this is to increase the precision of the estimates, not because we are 
concerned about the consistency of the estimator for δ.  As a robustness check on the 
results (described later), we include household-level effects and find no substantive 
differences in the estimates of the program effects, other than that they tend to be much 
more highly significant.
16 
To assess differences in effects for the poor and nonpoor for all the analyses 
considered below, we also classify households into three poverty groups￿extreme poor, 
poor, and nonpoor￿based on their per capita annual total household expenditures 
(including own-production) measured in 2000 and using 2001 national poverty lines 
developed by the World Bank (World Bank 2003).
17  Double-difference estimates were 
                                                 
16 Due to the random allocation of the program, none of the explanatory variables in equation (1) would be 
correlated with household-level effects, so we can safely treat them as either random or fixed.  The results 
are similar for the two different approaches. 
17 Another approach we considered for calculating the poverty groups was to adjust the 1998 national 
poverty lines for inflation up to 2000.  That methodology yields poverty lines that are similar but 3￿4 
percent higher than the 2001 national lines, since general inflation tends to outpace increases in the poverty 
line, given the more limited consumption basket on which the latter is based.  Categorizations based on this 
alternative approach do not substantively change the reported results. 23 
calculated within each poverty group and are discussed in the text (and presented in some 
of the tables) when they differ across the groups. 
Finally, since we do not condition on the individual household-level decision to 
participate but instead only on whether the program was available in the household￿s 
comarca, we are estimating what is commonly referred to as the ￿intent to treat￿ effect.  
Recall that about 10 percent of the households in the intervention areas were either 
excluded by RPS or chose not to participate.  Survey sample households in this subgroup 
are not program beneficiaries, so basing estimates that combine them with beneficiary 
households dilutes the estimated effects of the program.  The intent-to-treat methodology 
is a conservative one relative to measuring the effect of the treatment on the treated, 
though given the relatively high participation rates; it is unlikely to underestimate the 
effect on participating households by much.  Furthermore, the intent-to-treat estimate is 
less subject to selection biases associated with the decision to participate in the program.  
Finally, the advantages of the randomized design are dissipated if we estimate the effect 
of the treatment on the treated, since the evaluation was not designed to do that.  Rather 
than estimating the double difference, we would instead have to endogenize the 
participation decision, most likely by using the random program placement as an 
instrumental variable. 
In the double-difference analyses that follow, all (relevant) individuals or 
households from each survey round, regardless of whether they were interviewed in one, 
two, or three of the waves, are included.  On the whole, there were few significant 
differences between households (or individuals) in intervention and control groups at 
baseline; even when there were, of course, the double-difference estimator controls for 
them.  All standard errors are calculated allowing for heteroscedasticity and for clustering 
at the comarca level (Stata Corporation 2001).  We do not control for the fact that the 
randomization was at the comarca level￿so-called ￿community effects.￿  When we do 
not control for heteroscedasticity and comarca-level clustering, or when we do control 
for community-level effects, the standard errors decrease, leading to stronger statistical 24 
significance.  Consequently, the results we present are conservative in terms of their 
significance. 
We also ignore the stratified sample design, which can be corrected for 
statistically by using comarca-level sample weights; correcting for this aspect of the 
design made no substantive changes to the estimated effects, so we chose not to do so in 
order to present estimates with the more conservatively estimated standard errors 
described above.  Similarly, when we limit the sample to those interviewed in all three 
rounds as a partial control for attrition bias, estimated effects change only slightly, with 
no systematic bias. 
Another partial remedy to control for attrition bias is to estimate a household 
fixed-effects model, particularly if one suspects that unobserved persistent heterogeneity 
is leading to attrition.  However, as with the other robustness checks, when we estimate 
the models with these controls, the results differ little.  Recall that the number of 
households is about evenly divided between intervention and control groups, suggesting 
that attrition was not significantly different between intervention and control groups.  
Combining this with the evidence from the robustness checks just described, we conclude 
that attrition bias is not driving the results presented here. 
4.  The Effects of Conditional Cash Transfers:  The Red de Protecci￿n Social 
As a condition for approval of the second tranche of the IADB loan underwriting 
RPS, an evaluation was carried out by IFPRI assessing the main objectives of the 
program.  The IADB loan document contained a set of specific indicators and numerical 
goals for each objective (see Appendix B, Table 26), and these were used in the sample 
size calculations described in the first portion of Section 3.  While the program achieved 
most of these goals and the loan extension was approved, we do not emphasize these 
specific indicators in our analysis.  This is because (1) they represent only a subset of the 
possible effects of the program, (2) at the time, the program designers had little 
information on which to base the numerical goals, and so they are somewhat arbitrary, 25 
and (3) they largely measure process or inputs and did not capture the underlying 
objectives of the program such as improved human capital.  While we are in favor of the 
trend by development institutions to embed project evaluations in projects, we would 
caution against overspecifying the goals or holding to them too rigidly, particularly when 
little evidence of similar programs exists.  Hence, while we present results for the 
contractually agreed-to indicators, we do not compare the results with the numerical 
goals.  Moreover, we present results on a large number of additional indicators including 
direct measures of one form of human capital, the nutritional status of children under 
age 5. 
Household Expenditures 
At the outset, we indicated that 36￿61 percent of the rural population in each of 
the RPS municipalities was extremely poor, and 78￿90 percent was extremely poor or 
poor, compared with national averages in 1998 of 21 and 45 percent, respectively.  
Though not the poorest municipalities in the country, the proportion of impoverished 
people living in these areas was well above the national average.  Within the 42 comarcas 
selected for the program evaluation, 42 percent of the population was extremely poor 
before the program￿that is to say, their total expenditures were less than the amount 
necessary to purchase a food basket providing minimum caloric requirements (World 
Bank 2003)￿and 80 percent extremely poor or poor.
18  Moreover, the majority of the 
remaining households, or ￿nonpoor￿ in the sample, was in the bottom two-thirds of the 
national Nicaraguan per capita expenditure distribution and so was near-poor.  Clearly 
there was substantial need, and hence scope, for alleviating current poverty in this 
population. 
                                                 
18 These and other descriptions of poverty in the RPS sample are calculated based on 2001 per capita 
annual expenditure poverty lines of $C2,691 ($202) for extreme poor (calculated as the amount required to 
purchase a minimum requirement food basket) and $C5,157 ($386) for poor, which adds nonfood 
requirements (World Bank 2003).  Households are classified into poverty groups based on their initially 
measured (in 2000) per capita annual total household expenditures (including own-production) using these 
2001 Nicaraguan poverty lines.  26 
Table 5 shows the average effect of RPS on nominal annual total household 
expenditures, as measured by the double-difference methodology.
19  The control column 
shows that in 2000, before the program began, average annual total household 
expenditures in the control areas were C$20,695.  A year later, expenditures had declined 
by C$2,626 to C$17,970, but by 2002, they had recovered somewhat, reaching C$18,856.  
The intervention column shows preprogram annual total household expenditures of 
C$20,903 in the beneficiary areas.  After one year of operation of RPS, annual total 
household expenditures had risen by more than C$1,000 to C$22,142, but then fell back 
to C$21,307 in 2002, only C$404 (less than 2 percent) above the level reported in the 
2000 baseline. 
 
Table 5￿Red de Protecci￿n Social (RPS) average effect on annual total household 
expenditures 
Survey round  Intervention  Control  Difference 
Follow-up 2002  21,307  18,856  2,451 
 [722]  [712]  (1,649) 
Follow-up 2001  22,142  17,970  4,172*** 
 [766]  [724]  (1,300) 
Baseline 2000  20,903  20,695  307 
 [811]  [771]  (1,215) 
      
Difference 2001-2000  1,239  -2,626***  3,864*** 
 (808)  (1,053)  (1,311) 
Difference 2002-2000  404  -1,739*  2,144* 
 (812)  (993)  (1,268) 
Source:  RPS baseline 2000 and RPS 2001 and 2002 follow-up surveys. 
Notes:  Standard errors correcting for heteroscedasticity and allowing for clustering at the comarcas level 
are shown in parentheses (StataCorp 2001); number of observations are shown in brackets.  
*** indicates significance at the 1 percent level; ** at the 5 percent level; and * at the 10 percent 
level. 
 
                                                 
19 The construction of the expenditure measures is detailed in IFPRI (2001b).  We present nominal figures 
rather than real inflation-adjusted figures to enable a more direct comparison with the fixed nominal 
transfer levels. 27 
As shown in the right-hand ￿Difference￿ column, before the program began, 
annual total household expenditures in 2000 were very similar in intervention and control 
areas (differing by only C$307), indicating that on this measure, the randomization into 
two groups was effective.  One year later, however, that small initial difference had 
grown to C$4,172, and the net average increase, or double-difference estimate of the 
effect of the program between 2000 and 2001, was C$3,864 (statistically significant at 
the 1 percent level).  With the partial recovery of expenditures in the control group in the 
second year, however, the estimated effect of the program declined to C$2,144 
(marginally statistically significant at the 10 percent level).
20  For comparison, the 
average value of cash transfers for beneficiary households in the evaluation survey was 
C$3,500 in the first 12 months of operation and C$3,800 in the second 12 months (as 
only five of the scheduled six payments were made in each year).  Beneficiary 
households are, on average, spending a large proportion of their transfers on current 
expenditures (rather than increasing savings, for example), though the fraction spent 
appears to have been smaller in the second year, perhaps, in part, because it was less 
necessary as the area underwent a partial recovery compared to 2001.  Comparing across 
the extreme poor, poor, and nonpoor in the sample, we find that the largest estimated 
double-difference effect was for extremely poor households (over C$3,000 in 2002). 
The drop in expenditures in the control group seems to have been due in part to an 
economic downturn in the areas where RPS was operating and in Nicaragua more 
generally.  Within the control group, expenditures fell among the poor and nonpoor but 
                                                 
20 This effect is not statistically significant at the 5 percent level, in large part because of the asymmetric 
distribution of total expenditures.  When we examine the double-difference estimate on the natural 
logarithm of annual total household expenditures (so that they more closely approximate a normal 
distribution), it is significant at the 1 percent level.  In the text, we present absolute measures to facilitate 
comparison with the nominal transfer amounts. 28 
held steady for the extremely poor.
21  Two events affecting the area included a severe 
drought in 2001 and a sharp, persistent, drop in international coffee prices, which affected 
many of the agricultural laborers in that industry (Varangis et al. 2003).  The rural 
Central Region of Nicaragua was the most affected by these events and was the only 
region showing an increase in poverty rates between 1998 and 2001 (World Bank 2003).  
The transfers provided by RPS apparently compensated for income losses during this 
downturn.  While not designed as a traditional safety net program in the sense of reacting 
or adjusting to crises or shocks, the economic difficulties experienced by these 
communities allowed RPS to perform like one, as it enabled households to maintain 
expenditures during a downturn. 
The substantial decline in expenditures in the control areas demonstrates the 
importance of having a control group in this, or any, evaluation.  Control groups help 
isolate the effects attributable to the program and keep them from being confounded with 
other, nonprogram factors.  Without a control group, the analysis would have mistakenly 
concluded that the RPS had no effect on annual total household expenditures in 2002 (see 
C$404 difference over time in the intervention group in the second to bottom row of the 
first column of Table 5). 
The RPS effects on per capita annual total household expenditures are shown in 
Table 6.  Average per capita expenditures in 2000 were just over $300 compared to a 
national average of nearly $500 in 1999, again emphasizing the relative deprivation of the 
program areas.  Reflecting the pattern in total expenditures just described, combined with 
no significant changes in household size, the results show a small but insignificant 
                                                 
21 The drop in expenditures in the control group was not due to changes in household size or family 
composition (see Table 6 on per capita expenditures).  Another possibility is that there were biases in the 
reporting of expenditures.  For example, in control areas, it is possible that nonbeneficiaries who had 
learned about the program understated expenditures to appear more in need of the program.  However, at 
this stage, the program was being implemented using only geographical targeting, and being more or less 
poor would not have affected eligibility.  At the same time, beneficiaries may be overstating food 
expenditures knowing that increased expenditures on food was one of the objectives of RPS.  The fact that 
the net change in average expenditures is similar in magnitude to the amount of cash transfers suggests 
these sorts of reporting biases are not substantially altering the findings.  There would be more concern if, 
for example, changes in expenditures were substantially larger than the transfer. 29 
increase in per capita annual total household expenditures within the intervention group, 
but significant declines for the control group.  Taken together, these changes produce 
average program effects of C$850 in 2001 and C$521 in 2002.  In relative terms, in 2002 
the average effect of the RPS was about 13 percent of initial per capita annual household 
expenditures.  This average, however, masks substantial differences among the extreme 
poor, poor, and nonpoor in the sample.  For the extreme poor, the estimated average 
effect is C$781 for 2002 and represents over 40 percent of initial per capita expenditures, 
whereas for the nonpoor, the estimated effect was only 6 percent of initial per capita 
expenditures. 
Table 6￿Red de Protecci￿n Social (RPS) average effect on per capita annual total 
household expenditures 
Survey round  Intervention  Control  Difference 
Follow-up 2002  4,356  3,489  867** 
 [722]  [712]  (381) 
Follow-up 2001  4,461  3,266  1,195*** 
 [766]  [724]  (291) 
Baseline 2000  4,190  3,845  345 
 [811]  [771]  (288) 
      
Difference 2001-2000  271  -579***  850*** 
 (163)  (206)  (251) 
Difference 2002-2000  165  -356*  521** 
 (173)  (186)  (251) 
Source:  RPS baseline 2000 and RPS 2001 and 2002 follow-up surveys. 
Notes:  Standard errors correcting for heteroscedasticity and allowing for clustering at the comarcas level 
are shown in parentheses (StataCorp 2001); number of observations are shown in brackets.  




Since the changes in expenditures for poorer households were relatively large, 
RPS had a substantial effect on the percentage of extremely poor households in the 
program areas.  The average effect on the extreme poverty rate in 2001 was -21 
percentage points; in 2002, it was -15 percentage points.  Declines in the overall poverty 
rate were smaller, -10 and -5 percentage points, respectively.  Unsurprisingly, the income 30 
supplementation has a significant effect on expenditure-based poverty measures of 
￿current￿ poverty.  In Figure 2, we show this in an alternative fashion by graphing the 
empirical density functions of the logarithm of per capita annual total household 
expenditures in the year 2002 for households in the control and intervention groups 
separately.  This makes it clear that the program has shifted the density function to the 
right (and decreased its spread) and that the percentages of households that are extremely 
poor (to the left of the extreme poverty line) or poor (to the left of the poverty line) are 
substantially lower in the intervention comarcas.  Nevertheless, even in the intervention 
comarcas, a large proportion of households remain poor. 
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Showing a pattern similar to per capita annual total household expenditures, RPS 
produced significant net average increases in per capita annual food expenditures of 
C$774 in 2001 and C$556 in 2002 (Table 7), and these averages again mask larger 31 
effects for the extreme poor and poor.  The average increases in the per capita annual 
food expenditures are approximately equal to the average changes in per capita annual 
total household expenditures in each year.  Consistent with the program￿s goals, 
additional expenditures as a result of the transfers were spent predominantly on food.  
During the incorporation assemblies and some of the health education workshops, an 
informal ￿requirement￿ that the income supplements are primarily intended for food 
purchases is emphasized; in addition, anecdotal evidence suggests that some promotoras 
take this aspect of the program very seriously, asking to see receipts after transfers have 
been made (though it is not possible to gauge whether this practice is widespread).  
Regardless, RPS was very important in preventing the deterioration of the food security 
situation in the intervention group, offsetting the decline seen in the control group.  
Though we are unable to directly test this hypothesis, these results point to a likely 
increase in calories consumed (at the household level), as has been shown for 
PROGRESA (Hoddinott and Skoufias 2003). 
Table 7￿Red de Protecci￿n Social (RPS) average effect on per capita annual food 
expenditures 
Survey round  Intervention  Control  Difference 
Follow-up 2002  3,027  2,246  781*** 
 [722]  [712]  (253) 
Follow-up 2001  3,129  2,141  988*** 
 [766]  [724]  (217) 
Baseline 2000  2,812  2,598  214 
 [811]  [771]  (181) 
      
Difference 2001-2000  316*  -457***  774*** 
 (138)  (129)  (187) 
Difference 2002-2000  214*  -352**  566*** 
 (123)  (142)  (186) 
Source:  RPS baseline 2000 and RPS 2001 and 2002 follow-up surveys. 
Notes:  Standard errors correcting for heteroscedasticity and allowing for clustering at the comarcas level 
are shown in parentheses (StataCorp 2001); number of observations are shown in brackets.  
*** indicates significance at the 1 percent level; ** at the 5 percent level; and * at the 10 percent 
level. 
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Table 8 shows how the significant changes in per capita food expenditures 
affected the share of food expenditures in the household budget￿RPS produced a 
significant net increase of 4.1 percentage points in the food share, and this change was 
roughly the same across poverty groups.  The percentage of the budget spent on food did 
not change for households in the intervention group after implementation (remaining at 
70 percent, consistent with the high rates of poverty for this group compared to the 
national average of 60 percent in 1998). 
Table 8￿Red de Protecci￿n Social (RPS) average effect on food shares (percent) 
Survey round  Intervention  Control  Difference 
Follow-up 2002  70.0  66.4  3.7*** 
 [722]  [712]  (0.9) 
Follow-up 2001  70.0  66.5  3.4** 
 [766]  [724]  (1.4) 
Baseline 2000  69.8  70.2  -0.5 
 [811]  [771]  (1.3) 
      
Difference 2001-2000  0.2  -3.7***  3.9*** 
 (1.2)  (1.2)  (1.7) 
Difference 2002-2000  0.3  -3.9***  4.1*** 
 (0.9)  (0.9)  (1.3) 
Source:  RPS baseline 2000 and RPS 2001 and 2002 follow-up surveys. 
Notes:  Standard errors correcting for heteroscedasticity and allowing for clustering at the comarcas level 
are shown in parentheses (StataCorp 2001); number of observations are shown in brackets.  




This net average effect on the food share is consistent with the program￿s success 
in promoting increased food expenditures.  The estimated effect comes not from an 
increase in the food share for beneficiaries, however, but from a decline in the food share 
of the control group.  What is somewhat puzzling is why￿during an economic downturn 
marked by decreased expenditures￿the food share would be declining for control 
households.  For a relatively poor population such as this, we would have expected the 
food share to increase as total expenditures declined, since in this and most samples, 33 
households with greater per capita expenditures typically have lower food shares.  It turns 
out that much of the decline in the food share for the control group can be attributed to 
implementing the 2001 and 2002 surveys in October rather than in August and 
September, when the baseline 2000 survey was carried out.  In a quality-control survey 
carried out in October 2000 on a randomly selected subset of baseline households, food 
shares are substantially lower than they were in baseline interviews (IFPRI 2001b).  
Seasonality seems to play an important role in the absolute levels we observe, though, as 
emphasized above, it is not biasing the estimated average effects of the program, which 
show a net increase in the food share for beneficiary households relative to 
nonbeneficiary households. 
In addition to enabling more spending on food, one of the objectives of RPS is to 
improve the food security and nutrition of beneficiary households.  We begin to explore 
how well this was achieved by decomposing the increase in food expenditures into its 
component parts.  The RPS baseline and RPS follow-up surveys list 60 types of food 
purchased or obtained by home production in the households (IFPRI 2001a).  It appears 
that the transfers have had a significant effect on dietary diversity, a correlate of food 
security (Hoddinott and Yohannes 2002).  A double-difference estimate of the number of 
different types of purchases reported shows that the program appears to be promoting a 
more diverse diet.  At the outset in 2000, households reported consuming an average of 
12 (SD 5.4) different items, excluding alcohol and tobacco.  On average, households in 
the intervention areas report that they are buying four additional types of food from the 
listed 60 types in 2002, a result that was consistent across the poverty groups (results not 
shown). 
Not only did the number of foods purchased increase, but the nutritional value or 
quality of food items did as well.  By organizing the types of food into different 
categories, two conclusions can be reached (see Table 9).  First, in absolute terms, 34 
expenditure on nearly all food groups increased with the program.
22  Second, nutrient-
dense foods, including meats and fruits and vegetables, which are associated with a better 
quality diet, increased not only in terms of absolute expenditures but also as a percentage 
of total food expenditures.  These relative improvements were accompanied by an 
increase in fats (including oils) as well, and were made possible by declines in two 
staples (grains and beans) that represented over 60 percent of the preintervention budgets 
of beneficiary households.  Moreover, extremely poor households show the largest 
changes in the nutritional quality of the food purchased, indicating those most in need 
were benefiting the most.  Exploring whether this improved diet was associated with the 
nutritional improvements for children within these households is the subject of the 
section on Child Nutrition Status below. 
Table 9￿Red de Protecci￿n Social (RPS) average effect the composition of food 
expenditures 
Food category  2000 average 
2000-2002 average 
effect on expenditures  2000 average 
2000-2002 average 
effect on food share
 (C$)  (C$)  (percent)  (percent) 
Grains, potatoes, bread  6,987  504  48.3  -3.2*** 
Beans 1,454  -138  11.3  -3.1*** 
Meat 1,132  656*** 7.0  1.9*** 
Milk 546  122  3.4  0.4 
Fats 1,288  663*** 9.2  1.9** 
Fruits and vegetables  761  494*** 5.2  2.3*** 
Alcohol and tobacco 104  18  0.6  0.0 
Sweets 996  321*** 7.7  0.5 
Other 865  -129  6.6  -1.1* 
Source:  RPS baseline 2000 and RPS 2001 and 2002 follow-up surveys. 
Notes:  Standard errors correcting for heteroscedasticity and allowing for clustering at the comarcas level 
are shown in parentheses (StataCorp 2001); number of observations are shown in brackets.  
*** indicates significance at the 1 percent level; ** at the 5 percent level; and * at the 10 percent 
level. 
 
The majority of the additional expenditures induced by RPS were spent on food.  
A second key component of the program is education.  In 2002, the estimated average 
                                                 
22 Information about alcohol and tobacco expenditures in these types of surveys is not very reliable; it is 
presented separately, and we draw no conclusions from the reported information. 35 
effect of RPS on educational expenditures was C$302 (significant at 1 percent), slightly 
larger than the value of the educational supplies transfer.  These gains were concentrated 
in the extreme poor and poor households.  Health-care expenditures actually decreased 
with RPS (￿C$231), though this effect is only significant when we consider separately 
the extreme poor.  This is consistent with the fact that the program provides many health 
services free of charge, which were possibly substituting for others that beneficiaries 
previously had to pay for directly or via other related costs, such as travel expenses. 
Finally, the study asked about other forms of expenditures related to investments 
at the household level, such as on household improvements, durable goods, etc.; none of 
these showed significant changes.  Naturally, since total expenditures were flat while the 
percentage spent on food remained the same, it was unlikely that investments of this sort 
would have changed very much.  It is important to emphasize that the evidence indicates 
that households are indeed following the recommendations of the program, i.e., they are 
spending most of their income from the program on current (food and education) 
expenditures.  This pattern will need to be considered as RPS plans its exit strategy and 
may have implications for the sustainability of the effects described in this paper. 
Another possible effect of the program on the household economy is on labor 
participation; cash transfers may be a disincentive to work.  Examining separately women 
and men ages 15￿50, healthy, and not in school, the results show that there were no 
significant changes in labor participation in the previous week or in the number of 
laborers per household.  Nearly all men report having worked the week before, and there 
are no differences between the two periods or between the intervention and control areas.  
For women, about 70 percent reported working in the previous week, but as with the 
men, there were no program effects on the probability of working.  The program does 
appear to have lead to a slight decrease in the intensity of work (conditional on working), 
as measured by the average hours worked last week, which declined, on average, about 
two hours per worker. 36 
Schooling and Child Labor
23 
Education levels in Nicaragua are dismal.  One-third of adults over age 25 have 
no formal education and another one-third never completed primary school.  Although 
increasing school coverage and stable political conditions in the 1990s have spurred 
improvements, at 78 percent the net primary enrollment ratio remained one of the lowest 
in Latin America in the late 1990s (World Bank 2001, Annex 16).  Unsurprisingly, these 
low enrollment rates are accompanied by a high incidence of child labor, particularly for 
boys.   In 1998, 27 percent of boys ages 10-14 in rural areas were working an average 30 
hours a week (World Bank 2001, Annex 25).  These poor outcomes, despite 
improvements in school supply, are primary concerns for the economic development of 
Nicaragua; at the same time, they suggest a potentially large role for demand-side 
interventions such as RPS. 
Before the start of RPS, the enrollment rate in the program area for the target 
group, those ages 7-13 who had not yet completed fourth grade of primary school, was 71 
percent.  This overall average demonstrated a large potential for improved outcomes but 
at the same time masked important differences by age of the child and level of household 
well-being.  Figure 3a shows enrollment (or matriculation) rates by age for the sample in 
2000.  For the targeted children, enrollment peaked at 81 percent for 9-year olds but 
declined to 46 percent by age 13.  Thus, even at its peak, there was substantial room for 
improvement.  In addition, the (initially rising) age pattern indicated that, of those 
children who eventually attend school, many start late; the legal starting age for first 
grade is 7.  A possible effect of the program may be not only to increase overall 
attendance but also to improve appropriate-age starts.  
Figure 3b shows the enrollment rates for the same children by gender and by 
household expenditure group:  extremely poor, poor (though not extremely poor), and 
nonpoor.  These simple comparisons indicate that resources play a role in the decision to  
                                                 
23 This section updates and extends to 2002 results from 2001 first reported in Maluccio (2004). 37 
Figure 3a￿Enrollment in 2000 for 7-to-13-year-olds who have not completed fourth grade, 
by age 
































Figure 3b￿Enrollment in 2000 for 7-to-13-year-olds who have not completed fourth grade, 
by expenditure group and by gender 
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enroll children.  Indeed, children living in households in the lowest per capita expenditure 
decile in the sample were more than one-third less likely to have enrolled than those 
living in the wealthiest decile (not shown).  There was little difference between the 
enrollment rates for boys and girls.  Although not controlling for the many other factors 38 
that affect enrollment, this evidence still suggests that there was potential for a cash 
transfer program to influence enrollment rates, for boys and girls alike.  Similar patterns 
emerge for current attendance in school in 2000, collected approximately three months 
before the end of the academic year and shown in Figure 4.  A child is defined to be 
currently attending if he indicated he was still enrolled and had either missed three or 
fewer days in the past month or had missed more, but due to illness.  As with enrollment 
at the start of the year, current attendance rises to age 9 and declines thereafter.  The 
percentage of children still in school toward the end of the academic year was, on 
average, 12 percentage points lower than the percentage enrolled at the outset of the year, 
indicating that dropout was common.   Once again, it is evident that there was substantial 
room for improvement.  Girls were five percentage points more likely to be currently 
attending school than boys, foreshadowing the gender differences in labor participation 
we consider next. 
All individuals over age 6 were asked whether work was their primary activity in 
the previous week and, if not, why they did not work.  Work included working for pay or 
other remuneration outside the home, as well as unpaid labor in household enterprises 
such as agriculture or small business.  Possible reasons for not working most relevant to 
children were that they were in school or they were disabled.  If the primary activity was 
not work, the child was further prompted about other activities in the previous week.  The 
child was considered to be working if work was a primary or secondary activity, with 
positive hours worked.  The vast majority of child workers were agricultural laborers or 
unskilled helpers and typically worked without pay. 
While children under age 10 rarely reported working, from age 10 upward they 
were increasingly likely to work; 45 percent of 13-year-olds in the sample reported 
working.  Average hours worked also increased with age.  There was no obvious 
monotonic relationship, however, between working and the economic well-being of the 
household.  This undoubtedly reflects the likelihood that child labor increases household 
expenditures, our measure of well-being.  Boys were substantially more likely to report 39 
Figure 4a￿Current attendance in 2000 for 7-to-13-year-olds who have not completed 
fourth grade, by age 































Figure 4b￿Current attendance in 2000 for 7-to-13-year-olds who have not completed 
fourth grade, by expenditure group and by gender 






























working.  By age 13, only one-quarter of the girls reported working compared to nearly 
60 percent of the boys.  Conditional on working, boys also worked longer hours, 
averaging 25 hours per week compared to 16 hours for girls.  Given the questionnaire￿s 
orientation toward economically productive activities aside from housework, the 40 
difference between boys and girls￿ reported work might reflect in part the underreporting 
of girls￿ domestic responsibilities. 
With these basic facts describing the pre-RPS conditions in the study areas, we 
now examine how the program has changed the landscape, considering first the overall 
average effects and then the effects by age group. 
RPS induced a significant average net increase in school enrollment at the start of 
the school year of 17.7 percentage points for the target population of children ages 7￿13 
who had not yet completed the fourth grade of primary school (Table 10).  With the 
program, enrollment rose to 92.7 percent.  Before the program, enrollment rates in 
intervention and control areas for this age group were very similar, with approximately 
70 percent of eligible children enrolling.  Enrollment in the control group increased only 
6.8 percentage points, indicating that the transfers proved to be a huge stimulus.
24  For 
Table 10￿Red de Protecci￿n Social (RPS) average effect on enrollment, children 7-to-13 
years old in first through fourth grades 
Survey round  Intervention  Control  Difference 
Follow-up 2002  92.7  79.2  13.4*** 
 [806]  [872]  (2.6) 
Follow-up 2001  93.0  75.1  17.8*** 
 [896]  [869]  (3.0) 
Baseline 2000  68.3  72.5  -4.2 
 [978]  [892]  (4.9) 
      
Difference 2001-2000  24.7*** 2.6  22.1*** 
 (3.6)  (1.9)  (4.0) 
Difference 2002-2000  24.4***  6.7**  17.7*** 
 (4.0)  (2.5)  (4.7) 
Source:  RPS baseline 2000 and RPS 2001 and 2002 follow-up surveys. 
Notes:  Standard errors correcting for heteroscedasticity and allowing for clustering at the comarcas level 
are shown in parentheses (StataCorp 2001); number of observations are shown in brackets.  
*** indicates significance at the 1 percent level; ** at the 5 percent level; and * at the 10 percent 
level. 
                                                 
24 In four cases, individual schools appear to serve students in both intervention and control comarcas.  
This is a problem for interpretation of the estimated effects since, unlike the arguments we make regarding 
this form of contamination with respect to health post, crowding in schools may lead to individuals in the 
control group being discouraged from attending.  The rate of increase in the control group, however, is 
similar to municipality level trends (taking out RPS schools), so we expect any such contamination bias to 
be small. 41 
comparison, double-difference estimates of changes in enrollment due to PROGRESA 
were under 5 percent for primary school students (largely because enrollment in primary 
school in Mexico was already high) and around 12 percentage points for Grades 6￿8 
(Schultz 2000). 
To examine what underlies the average effect of 17.7 percentage points on 
enrollment, we consider the effect of the program by age.  The results are shown in 
Figure 5a, in which the bottom, dotted portion of each column shows the initial situation 
described earlier (Figure 3a), and the top, white, portion is the double-difference 
estimated average program effect.  In all cases, this effect was positive (though it is not 
statistically significant for ages 10￿12).  Enrollment rates in the intervention areas are 
now 90￿100 percent for those ages 7￿12, and no longer vary by age.
25 
Figure 5a shows that gains were made in enrollment by reaching both younger 
children, who are now more likely to enroll (no longer delaying entry into school) and, at 
the same time, older children who had completed some schooling and left but now are 
returning.  A potential concern for the latter group is that they were returning to the first 
two grades.  If so, this would lead to more mixing of younger and older children in the 
same grade with classroom disruption a possible consequence. Nearly all (80 percent) of 
the overall improvement in enrollment came from younger children, however, and most 
of the older children who returned to school were returning to the third and fourth grades.  
Moreover, both the average and standard deviation of child age by grade remained 
constant before and after the program, indicating little change in overall classroom 
composition.  Figure 5b presents results for enrollment by household expenditure group 
and by gender.  Clearly, the extreme poor and poor are benefiting most￿the relationship 
between enrollment and per capita expenditures has largely been erased.  The effects for 
boys and girls were the same. 
                                                 
25 Note that while these bar charts are a convenient way of summarizing program effects, it is not possible 
to interpret the sum of the two parts of each column as the enrollment rate with the program.  This fact 
becomes evident, for example, in the subgroup of 9-year olds, for whom the sum is higher than 100 
percent. 42 
Figure 5a￿Red de Protecci￿n Social (RPS) average effect on enrollment for 7-to-13-year-
olds who have not completed fourth grade, by age 







































Figure 5b￿Red de Protecci￿n Social (RPS) average effect on enrollment for 7-to-13-year-
olds who have not completed fourth grade, by expenditure group and by gender 
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Of course, enrollment does not guarantee that a child will continue in school 
throughout the school year, nor does it mean that he attends school regularly.  In order to 
continue receiving the education transfers, the program requires that no enrolled student 
have six or more unjustified absences in a two-month period (see Table 2).  The effect of 43 
the program on current attendance was even larger than that on enrollment, with an 
average program effect of 23 percentage points for children ages 7￿13.  The effect was 
significant for all age groups except 12-year olds (Figure 6a).  As with enrollment, the 
extreme poor and poor benefited the most (Figure 6b).  Nonetheless, the nonpoor also 
experienced significant gains in current attendance.  Boys benefited more than girls, in 
part because of their lower starting point.  These findings indicate that there have been 
positive effects, even for those children who were attending school prior to the program 
as they are now attending more regularly. 
The final aspect of the effect of RPS on education we consider is grade 
advancement or continuation rates￿the percentage of students in each grade who 
progressed two grades during the two years of RPS operation.  Unlike the enrollment and 
current attendance results just presented, the effect of RPS on continuation rates is 
measured as a first difference, since information at two points in time is required to 
calculate progression.  The estimated effect is the difference between the percentage of 
students continuing in the intervention areas and the percentage in the control areas.  
Overall, the effect is significant and shows an average improved retention rate of 6.5 
percent.  Table 11 shows the results by starting grade.  Though not very precisely 
estimated for these subgroups, we still find significant effects for those starting in Grades 
1 and 4 (in 2000).  An unanticipated benefit of the program was the large effect on those 
making the transition from fourth to fifth and sixth grades.  This effect was surprising, 
because enrollment in the fifth grade or higher was not one of the conditions for receiving 
the education transfer.  Unfortunately, it was not possible to determine exactly why this is 
occurring.  It may be simply an income effect of the program.  It could also be due to 
potentially long-lasting changes in attitudes toward education.  Finally, it may merely 
reflect confusion about the program requirements.  Examining continuation rates for all 
four grades at once for the different expenditure groups (Table 12) shows that, as with the 
other measures, there is a tendency for the largest effects of the program to be 
concentrated among poorer households.  The effects were similar for boys and girls. 44 
Figure 6a￿Red de Protecci￿n Social (RPS) average effect on current attendance for 
7-to-13-year-olds who have not completed fourth grade, by age 







































Figure 6b￿Red de Protecci￿n Social (RPS) average effect on current attendance for 
7-to-13-year-olds who have not completed fourth grade, by expenditure group 
and by gender 
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Table 11￿Red de Protecci￿n Social (RPS) average effect on school advancement, children 
7-to-13 years old in first through fourth grades (2000-2002), by starting grade 
Grade  Grade 1  Grade 2  Grade 3  Grade 4 
Intervention 93.3  90.0  82.7  84.7 
 [328]  [150]  [139]  [118] 
Control 85.6  85.8  77.0  73.7 
 [340]  [190]  [122]  [95] 
Difference  7.7*** 4.2  5.7  11.1** 
 (2.9)  (3.6)  (6.0)  (4.4) 
Source:  RPS baseline 2000 and RPS 2001 and 2002 follow-up surveys. 
Notes:  Standard errors correcting for heteroscedasticity and allowing for clustering at the comarcas level 
are shown in parentheses (StataCorp 2001); number of observations are shown in brackets.  




Table 12￿Red de Protecci￿n Social (RPS) average effect on school advancement, children 
7-to-13 years old in first through fourth grades (2000-2002), by poverty group 
Group Extreme  poor  Poor  Nonpoor 
Intervention 87.5  91.9  86.8 
  [320] [309] [106] 
Control 82.3  82.9  84.5 
 [423]  [240]  [84] 
Difference  5.2*  9.0*** 2.3 
 (3.0)  (3.2)  (5.7) 
Source:  RPS baseline 2000 and RPS 2001 and 2002 follow-up surveys. 
Notes:  Standard errors correcting for heteroscedasticity and allowing for clustering at the comarcas level 
are shown in parentheses (StataCorp 2001); number of observations are shown in brackets.  




RPS had a massive effect on enrollment and current attendance in the intervention 
areas.  Even though only about one-third of the rural comarcas in each municipality were 
included in the pilot phase, increases in enrollment could be seen even in the aggregate 
municipal-level data compiled by the Ministry of Education.  In the six municipalities 
combined, there was an increase of about 5 percent in enrollment in Grades 1￿4 between 
1999 and 2000 before the program.  The increase was nearly 18 percent between 2000 
and 2001, far higher than what occurred in the rest of the country during that period. 46 
While schools were generally available in RPS program areas as a result of the 
targeting described above, steps were taken to accommodate the large changes in 
enrollment as the program developed.  The two principal steps were increasing the 
number of sessions per day and increasing the number of teachers.  RPS supported local 
communities in their efforts to solicit additional teachers from the Ministry of Education.  
For most rural schools, this was a straightforward process, because they operate under an 
autonomous system with substantial local control.
26  In one RPS municipality with a 
smaller proportion of autonomous schools, however, it was more difficult to increase the 
number of teachers.  In some cases, this problem was resolved when beneficiary parents 
agreed, on the suggestion of RPS, to contribute part of their transfers to help pay for a 
new teacher for the first year.  In other cases, staffing problems were not resolved.  
Possibly reflecting these problems, enrollment rates were the lowest in this municipality, 
though they were still 90 percent, on average.  In sum, the overall level of enrollment left 
little room for improvement, and supply does not appear to have been a major constraint.  
This achievement, however, required active intervention and coordination on the part of 
RPS. 
Among those children not enrolled, economic reasons were cited in nearly half 
the cases, and work was specifically cited for about 10 percent of cases.  For those who 
dropped out during the year, work was cited as the main cause 20 percent of the time.  
The need to work plays a role in schooling decisions, though apparently not the dominant 
one.  We now examine whether the implementation of RPS reduced child labor for the 
target population children.  For every age group, the percentage of children working was 
lower after the program (though in no case significantly so, given the relatively small 
sample sizes and low percentages reporting work).  When we combine those children 
ages 7￿13 who have not completed the fourth grade, the double-difference estimator 
shows a 4.9 percentage point decrease in the number of children working, significant at a 
                                                 
26 In the early 1990s, a school reform was undertaken to devolve control from the central government to 
local schools or, in some rural areas, clusters of schools (King, Ozler, and Rawlings 1999). 47 
7 percent level (Table 13).  In both the intervention and control areas, the percentage of 
children working declined significantly.  This likely reflects the general economic 
downturn in the program area and seasonal fluctuations in work patterns.  Finally, while 
the effect on educational outcomes was the same for boys and girls (as described earlier), 
the effect on reported work for boys was twice as large as for girls.
27 
Table 13￿Red de Protecci￿n Social (RPS) average effect on working, children 7-to-13 
years old in first through fourth grades 
Survey round  Intervention  Control  Difference 
Follow-up 2002  5.9  12.9  -6.9*** 
 [807]  [883]  (2.3) 
Follow-up 2001  5.7  10.3  -4.5*** 
 [895]  [868]  (1.4) 
Baseline 2000  16.1  18.1  -2.0 
 [1,028]  [930]  (2.8) 
      
Difference 2001-2000  -10.4***  -7.8***  -2.5 
 (1.9)  (2.0)  (2.7) 
Difference 2002-2000  -10.1***  -5.2***  -4.9* 
 (1.8)  (1.9)  (2.6) 
Source:  RPS baseline 2000 and RPS 2001 and 2002 follow-up surveys. 
Notes:  Standard errors correcting for heteroscedasticity and allowing for clustering at the comarcas level 
are shown in parentheses (StataCorp 2001); number of observations are shown in brackets.  
*** indicates significance at the 1 percent level; ** at the 5 percent level; and * at the 10 percent 
level. 
Child Health Care 
Growth Monitoring and Development Program Participation 
A necessary and central feature of the growth monitoring and development 
program (Programa Vigilancia y Promoci￿n del Crecimiento y Desarrollo, hereafter 
VPCD) for children is the monthly visit (for children under age 2) and visits every other 
month (for children ages 2￿5) to a health-care provider.  Before the program, about 70 
percent of children under age 3 had been taken for a well-child checkup in the previous 
                                                 
27 This finding, like the finding that boys were more likely to work than girls, surely reflects in part how the 
questions about work were designed, focusing on work outside the home. 48 
six months.  In 2001, RPS produced a significant average increase of 19.5 percentage 
points in the percent of children under age 3 whose parents had taken them for a well-
child visit in the past six months, but only an increase of 11.0 percentage points in 2002 
(Table 14).
28  This deterioration in the effect from 2001 to 2002 was largely due to 
continued improvement in this indicator in the control group and reflects only a slight 
decline in intervention areas.  Indeed, during the period 2000￿02, the percentage taken to 
a health-care visit in the control group increased by 12.0 percentage points. 
Table 14￿Red de Protecci￿n Social (RPS) average effect on percent of children age 0-3 
taken to health control in past six months 
Survey round  Intervention  Control  Difference 
Follow-up 2002  92.7  84.9  7.9** 
 [276]  [350]  (3.4) 
Follow-up 2001  95.5  79.0  16.5*** 
 [377]  [391]  (5.1) 
Baseline 2000  69.8  72.9  -3.1 
 [437]  [435]  (6.2) 
      
Difference 2001-2000  25.7*** 6.2  19.5*** 
 (5.3)  (4.7)  (7.0) 
Difference 2002-2000  23.0***  12.0**  11.0* 
 (4.8)  (3.5)  (5.9) 
Source:  RPS baseline 2000 and RPS 2001 and 2002 follow-up surveys. 
Notes:  Standard errors correcting for heteroscedasticity and allowing for clustering at the comarcas level 
are shown in parentheses (StataCorp 2001); number of observations are shown in brackets.  




The RPS effect on the percentage taken to a health-care provider and weighed 
during the visit in the last six months, another key aspect of VPCD, was even larger 
(Table 15).  As above, there was an increase in the control group over the period of 16.2 
percentage points, but this change was swamped by a 33.7 percentage point effect in the 
intervention group, leading to an estimated average effect of 17.5 percentage points.  
                                                 
28 We consider children ages 0￿3 to cover the most vulnerable period in a child￿s development, as discussed 
below. 49 
Here again, an increase in the control group explains in large part why the estimated 
effect of the program dipped from 2001 to 2002. 
Table 15￿Red de Protecci￿n Social (RPS) average effect on percent of children age 0-3 
taken to health control and weighed in past six months 
Survey round  Intervention  Control  Difference 
Follow-up 2002  89.1  76.0  13.1*** 
 [276]  [350]  (4.2) 
Follow-up 2001  91.5  67.0  24.5*** 
 [377]  [391]  (5.8) 
Baseline 2000  55.4  59.8  -4.4 
 [437]  [435]  (8.3) 
      
Difference 2001-2000  36.1***  7.2*  28.9*** 
 (6.1)  (3.6)  (7.0) 
Difference 2002-2000  33.7***  16.2***  17.5** 
 (6.0)  (4.4)  (7.3) 
Source:  RPS baseline 2000 and RPS 2001 and 2002 follow-up surveys. 
Notes:  Standard errors correcting for heteroscedasticity and allowing for clustering at the comarcas level 
are shown in parentheses (StataCorp 2001); number of observations are shown in brackets.  
*** indicates significance at the 1 percent level; ** at the 5 percent level; and * at the 10 percent 
level. 
 
As with the effects for expenditures and schooling, average program effects for 
VPCD measures are larger among poorer households.  Table 16 presents results by 
poverty group for the two indicators just discussed.  It shows that average effects were 
much larger among the extreme poor and, at least in 2002, were not significantly positive 
for the poor or nonpoor.  Most of the nonpoor already regularly took their children to the 
health centers before the program, and as a result, the estimated effects for this group 
were small and insignificant.  An analysis contrasting the effects for girls and boys shows 
that they were no differences by gender (IFPRI 2003). 
In addition to these measures, a variety of other process indicators related to 
VPCD visits for children under age 3 were examined, including whether the child had a 
health card, the child￿s weight was graphed on the card, the child￿s health card was up-to-
date, and the child was given vitamins in the last six months.  All of these showed 
patterns similar to the ones just described (IFPRI 2003). 50 
Table 16￿Red de Protecci￿n Social (RPS) average effect on percent of children age 0-3 
taken to health control and weighed in past six months, by poverty group 
Group Extreme  poor  Poor  Nonpoor 
Taken to health control       
  DD 2001-2000  21.3**  22.0** 10.8 
 (8.6)  (8.3)  (8.7) 
  DD 2002-2000  17.0** 9.6  -5.4 
 (8.4)  (7.1)  (8.0) 
Weighed      
  DD 2001-2000  34.9***  27.7*** 15.9 
 (9.3)  (8.6)  (11.5) 
  DD 2002-2000  23.6** 12.4  9.6 
 (9.3)  (8.9)  (12.2) 
Source:  RPS baseline 2000 and RPS 2001 and 2002 follow-up surveys. 
Notes:  Standard errors correcting for heteroscedasticity and allowing for clustering at the comarcas level 
are shown in parentheses (StataCorp 2001); number of observations are shown in brackets.  
*** indicates significance at the 1 percent level; ** at the 5 percent level; and * at the 10 percent 
level. 
 
Even though the indicators agreed upon by RPS and IADB (Appendix B, Table 
26) did not include effects on children ages 3￿5, the program and program requirements 
do include these children.  On the whole, the results for all the indicators described for 
this older age group show an even greater effect than for their siblings under age 3 (IFPRI 
2003). 
It is important to emphasize that for most of the indicators considered, the control 
group also showed large improvements over the period, although on a much smaller 
scale.  A possible explanation for this increase is that other providers are bringing health 
services into the areas not covered by the program (program providers do not offer or 
deliver any services to nonbeneficiaries).  If this is the case, it could be considered as a 
kind of ￿contamination￿ of the randomized design of the evaluation.  The implication of 
this is that the effect of the program as measured by the estimated double difference may 
actually underestimate the true effect￿another indication of the conservative 
methodology used in this evaluation. 
A second possibility explaining the increase in these indicators in the control 
group is that previous to the program, these services would have been offered by the 
existing (mostly government run) health posts and health centers.  With the program, 51 
demand for such services has dropped substantially.  As a result, it is likely that waiting 
time diminished for those services, at least at the outset￿increasing demand for them 
within the control group.  Higher utilization within the control group would be the result.  
A final possibility is that RPS had a demonstration effect.  Control and intervention 
comarcas are at times adjacent to one another.  A household may be a beneficiary while 
its neighbor is a nonbeneficiary, particularly in a few cases where boundaries such as 
roads divide two comarcas.  Seeing the activity and the emphasis placed on the RPS 
objectives may lead nonbeneficiaries to undertake behavior they would not have 
otherwise.  Reasons for such actions could be many￿including the possibility that the 
individuals thought this was a way to become eligible. 
Vaccination for Children Ages 12￿23 Months 
There are a variety of indicators that can be used to evaluate the effect of RPS on 
vaccinations.  One common indicator that summarizes the overall situation is up-to-date 
vaccinations for children ages 12￿23 months.
29  For this measure, the 1998 Demographic 
and Health Survey shows the average coverage in rural areas of Nicaragua was 68 
percent; in the RPS baseline 2000, it was 38 percent, reflecting the relative poverty of the 
program areas. 
RPS produced an insignificant average net increase of 6.1 percentage points in 
up-to-date vaccination levels between 2000 and 2002 (see Table 17).  There was little 
difference across poverty groups.  Both intervention and control groups improved 
tremendously between 2000 and 2001 but saw setbacks between 2001 and 2002.  Control 
areas increased 29.3 percentage points over the period, offsetting nearly all of the 35.4 
percentage point gain in the intervention areas in the calculation of the double difference.  
                                                 
29 According to the Nicaraguan Ministry of Health guidelines, a child age 12￿23 months should have (at 
least) (1) one dose of BCG, (2) three doses of polio, (3) three doses of either Pentavalente or DPT, and (4) 
one dose of MMR (or possibly just measles if vaccinated before MINSA changed to MMR in 1998).  We 
calculate whether they have completed the vaccine schedule to date, that is, given their current age in 
months, calling this up-to-date vaccination.  For children under 18 months, the DPT booster is not required 
and is therefore not needed to be up-to-date; for those 18 months or older, it is. 52 
These substantial gains are even more impressive when contrasted with national figures 
that show coverage in rural areas declining from 68 percent in 1998 to 60 percent in 
2001.  It appears that the coordination with the Ministry of Health in the distribution of 
vaccines to RPS health providers in these municipalities had an indirect effect￿possibly 
strengthening the actions of the Ministry of Health or providing additional vaccines to the 
health posts serving the control group.  Similar results are found for the complete 
vaccination at 24 months indicator (IFPRI 2003).
30 
Table 17￿Red de Protecci￿n Social (RPS) average effect on percent of children age 12-23 
months with updated vaccination 
Survey round  Intervention  Control  Difference 
Follow-up 2002  71.7  69.5  2.3 
 [92]  [131]  (6.0) 
Follow-up 2001  81.9  71.4  10.5 
 [116]  [126]  (6.5) 
Baseline 2000  36.4  40.1  -3.8 
 [165]  [142]  (8.3) 
      
Difference 2001-2000  45.6***  31.3*** 14.2 
 (6.2)  (6.5)  (8.9) 
Difference 2002-2000  35.4***  29.3*** 6.1 
 (6.8)  (7.8)  (10.2) 
Source:  RPS baseline 2000 and RPS 2001 and 2002 follow-up surveys. 
Notes:  Standard errors correcting for heteroscedasticity and allowing for clustering at the comarcas level 
are shown in parentheses (StataCorp 2001); number of observations are shown in brackets.  
*** indicates significance at the 1 percent level; ** at the 5 percent level; and * at the 10 percent 
level. 
                                                 
30 When contrasted with RPS administrative data on vaccinations for beneficiary children, which show 
coverage of nearly 100 percent, the coverage reported in Table 17 and calculated for other vaccine 
measures are substantially lower.  Reasons for the discrepancy include (1) the analyses in this paper do not 
condition on being a beneficiary but only on living in an intervention community; (2) recall may not be 
complete and accurate when the health card is unavailable during the interview; (3) even when provided, 
the health card may be incorrect; and (4) due to the logistics of visiting communities, there is a small 
possibility of interviewing a child just after she turns old enough for a certain vaccine but has not had 
another visit to the health-care provider (it is prohibited to administer vaccines before the minimum age set 
by the Ministry of Health).  When one considers vaccine coverage for this group vaccine by vaccine, most 
are covered at 90 percent or above (IFPRI 2003); only when all are considered together do the coverage 
rates dip.  This could be consistent with minor errors as described above.  Finally, in addition to simply 
having been vaccinated, being vaccinated at the correct time is important￿late vaccinations can have 
deleterious consequences for effectiveness and the coverage of the population as a whole (Bolton et al. 
1998).  Since we do not consider directly the date of vaccination, ignoring the measurement concerns just 
outlined, these estimates tend to overestimate overall coverage. 53 
While the double-difference average effect estimate of the effect of RPS on 
vaccination coverage is neither large nor statistically significant, even with the variety of 
measurement problems described in footnote 30, it is all but impossible to avoid the 
conclusion that RPS had a large and positive effect on vaccination rates in the program 
areas. 
Child Nutritional Status 
In a separate interview module implemented in 2000 and 2002 only, the RPS 
assessed the nutritional status of all children under age 5 in survey households, measuring 
their height, weight, and hemoglobin.
31  In this section, we explore whether the improved 
household diet found in the section on expenditures, and the improved health-care 
services just described (including the growth and monitoring of children), have been 
accompanied by improvements in the nutritional status of children under age 5.  We first 
define the indicators we use to measure child nutritional status and how they should be 
interpreted (height-for-age, weight-for-height, weight-for-age, and hemoglobin) and then 
describe the findings, placing them in the context of both Nicaragua and Central 
America, an analysis made possible by the existence of comparable data across countries. 
In large part because they are growing so fast, young children have high 
nutritional requirements.  Unfortunately, the diet commonly offered to young children in 
developing countries to complement breast milk is of low quality (i.e., monotonous and 
with low energy and nutrient density) and, as a result, multiple nutrient deficiencies are 
common.  At the same time, young children are also very susceptible to infections, 
because their immature immune systems fail to protect them adequately.  In developing 
countries, foods and liquids are often contaminated and are thus key sources of frequent 
infections.  Infections reduce appetite, increase nutrient loss, and increase metabolic 
demands.  Finally, in many societies, inadequate traditional remedies for childhood 
                                                 
31 The weight and height for all children ages 6￿59 months in the RPS baseline 2000 and follow-up 2002 
households were measured according to standard international procedures.  The anthropometric indicators 
were calculated using EpiInfo v6.4c, eliminating all the observations that EpiInfo indicated had an error in 
measurement. 54 
infections, including withholding of foods and breast milk, are common.  Thus infection 
and malnutrition reinforce each other.  Focusing on the nutritional status of children is a 
powerful way to assess the effects of RPS, in particular because improvements during 
this vulnerable period persist throughout one￿s life and therefore have long-lasting 
positive benefits (Martorell et al. 1995). 
Severe protein-energy malnutrition presents itself as kwashiorkor and marasmus, 
syndromes that are characterized by clinical signs, marked metabolic disturbances, and 
high fatality rates in the absence of high-quality care (Waterlow 1992).  Severe 
malnutrition is rare, however, even in very poor countries.  Most malnutrition in children 
is best described as mild to moderate and is measured in terms of growth failure against a 
standard reference population.  Weight and height are expressed as age-specific Z-
scores
32 (described below) and the criterion of a Z-score of less than ￿2 for height-for-
age, weight-for-height, and weight-for-age is commonly used to identify stunting, 
wasting, and underweight, respectively.  The percentages of stunted and underweight 
children are standard ways of describing the extent of child malnutrition in societies (UN 
ACC/SCN 2000).  The following are the standard indicators. 
Height-for-age reflects linear growth before and after birth.  A short stature refers 
to short height-for-age that can reflect either normal variation in growth or a 
developmental deficit.  This deficit or retardation in growth is the cumulative effect of 
poor nutrition or inadequate health for an extended period of time.  A child is considered 
to be in deficit, or stunted, if his or her height-for-age Z-score (HAZ) is two or more 
standard deviations (SD) below the median of the international gender-specific reference 
population of the National Center of Health Statistics of the United States of 
America/World Health Organization, known as ￿NCHS/WHO￿ (WHO Expert 
Committee 1995). 
                                                 
32 Z-scores are used to normalize measured heights and weights against those found in well-nourished 
populations.  They are age- and sex-specific; for example, a Z-score of height-for-age is defined as 
measured height minus median height of the reference population all divided by the standard deviation for 
that age/sex category. 55 
Weight-for-height measures body weight relative to stature and similar to height-
for-age, a child is considered to be in deficit, or wasted, if his or her weight-for-height Z-
score (WHZ) is more than two standard deviations (SDs) below the median of the 
international reference population NCHS/WHO.  In general, this condition is the product 
of recent experience such as a severe lack of food or serious illness, which causes 
substantial weight loss.  It is also possible that the deficit originates from chronic 
nutrition deficiency or chronic illness. 
Weight-for-age measures body mass relative to age.  It is influenced both by 
stature and weight of children and, therefore, when there is a deficit, it is an indicator of 
both retarded growth and of weight loss.  For this reason, it is difficult to interpret.  When 
there is no deficit in weight-for-height, weight-for-age also indicates the accumulated 
effects of poor nutrition or health of an individual (or population), similar to the 
interpretation for HAZ.  Weight-for-age deficit is defined as weight-for-age Z-score 
(WAZ) more than two SDs below the median of the international reference population 
NCHS/WHO.  The statistical prevalence expected for this deficit, as well as for those for 
HAZ and WHZ, is 2￿3 percent in a healthy population. 
Anemia is hemoglobin concentration lower than a reference cutoff value.  Anemia 
can be caused by nutritional deficiencies in iron, folic acid, vitamin B12, or other 
nutrients.  Diseases or hereditary disorders also can cause anemia.  Therefore, 
hemoglobin as an indicator of iron deficiency has a low specificity.  However, it is 
responsive to improvements in iron intakes in deficient populations, has a functional 
significance, and is suitable for field settings.  Low hemoglobin in developing countries 
is a good indicator of iron deficiency anemia.  In this analysis, we use the international 
suggested cutoff point of 11.0 g/dlL for children 6￿59 months (MI 1999). 
In 1965￿67, Costa Rica had 27 percent stunting (not shown).  By 1982, that 
prevalence had fallen to 8 percent and stabilized (see Table 18, HAZ).  The example of 
Costa Rica shows that it is possible to substantially reduce malnutrition in a Central 
American country.  Guatemala has the highest malnutrition for children under age 5 in 
the region; in 1998￿99, 46 percent of its children were stunted.  Nevertheless, since 1987, 56 
Guatemala has been reducing the prevalence slowly, at a rate of about 1 percent per year.  
Honduras and El Salvador, however, showed little progress over the same period. 
Table 18￿Malnutrition in Central American countries 
Country and year  N 
Percent HAZ
< -2.0 SD 
Percent WAZ 
< -2.0 SD 
Percent WHZ 
< -2.0 SD 
Costa Rica         
  1982 (0-71 months)  2,250  7.6  6.3  1.9 
  1996 (12-83 months)  1,008  6.1  5.1  2.3 
Guatemala        
  1987 (3-35 months)  2,229  57.7  33.2  1.3 
  1995  7,768  49.7  26.6  3.3 
  1998/99  3,591  46.4  24.2  2.5 
Honduras        
  1987  3,244  37.2  20.6  1.7 
  1991  5,961  36.3  18.0  1.5 
  1993/94 (12-59 months)  1,875  39.6  18.3  2.0 
  1996  1,307  38.9  25.4  1.4 
  PRAF 2000 (subnational)  5,563  52.8  27.7  1.3 
Nicaragua        
  1993/94  3,546  22.5  11.0  1.9 
  1997/98  6,497  24.9  12.2  2.2 
  RPS 2000  1,199  41.4  15.0  0.7 
El Salvador         
  1988  >1,539  29.9  15.2  - 
  1993  3,515  23.1  11.2  1.3 
  1998  6,523  23.3  11.8  1.1 
Source:  (http://www.who.int/nutgrowthdb), IFPRI (2001c), and RPS 2000 and 2002 surveys. 
Notes:  Percentages less than ￿2 SD below the mean of the international reference population NCHS/WHO 
(WHO expert committee 1995) of children between 0 and 59 months (except where noted) in 
national surveys and the RPS surveys. 
 
 
Malnutrition in Nicaragua has been stable, with little sign of improvement since 
1987.  The prevalence of stunting for 1997￿98 is low (25 percent showing retarded 
growth) in comparison with Guatemala and Honduras (36￿40 percent), similar to El 
Salvador (23￿30 percent), and high in comparison to Costa Rica.  Table 18 shows that 
before the program, 41.4 percent of children under age 5 living in the RPS program areas 
suffered from retarded growth due to malnutrition or illness.  This is 1.7 times greater 
than the national prevalence for the 1997￿8 period and nearly 20 times greater than the 
expected statistical prevalence for a healthy population.  The areas where RPS operates 57 
exhibited substantially higher malnutrition than the national average.  This is due in part 
to the fact that, via targeting, poverty levels are high in these areas.  In this respect, RPS 
is similar to PRAF, where the level of stunting is also much higher than the national 
average for Honduras and where the children do not show recent severe lack of food 
and/or serious illness (0.7 percent with a WHZ more than 2 SD below the norm for RPS).  
Lastly, malnutrition increases with level of poverty within the RPS baseline 2000 sample, 
as well.  The poorest deciles (1 and 2) show the highest levels of stunting.  Less poor 
households have lower malnutrition and best-off households in the project areas do not 
show, on average, marked growth deficits, particularly the wealthiest 20 percent. 
Table 19 shows the double-difference estimate calculations for the percentage of 
children under age 5 who were stunted.  Before the program, intervention and control 
areas showed very similar high rates of stunting.  After two years of operation, stunting 
declined in the intervention areas by 4.7 percentage points, but was essentially stable in 
the control areas.  The average net effect of RPS was to reduce stunting prevalence by 5.3 
percentage points. 
Table 19￿Red de Protecci￿n Social (RPS) effect on percentage of children under 5 years 
of age who are stunted (HAZ < -2.00) 
Survey round  Intervention  Control  Difference 
Follow-up 2002  37.1  41.5  -4.3 
 [479]  [557]  (4.8) 
Baseline 2000  41.9  40.9  1.0 
 [614]  [585]  (4.5) 
      
Difference 2002-2000  -4.7** 0.6  -5.3* 
 (1.8)  (2.6)  (3.1) 
Source:  RPS baseline 2000 and RPS 2001 and 2002 follow-up surveys. 
Notes:  Standard errors correcting for heteroscedasticity and allowing for clustering at the comarcas level 
are shown in parentheses (StataCorp 2001); number of observations are shown in brackets.  




The current nutritional situation, as measured by wasting, is not a major concern 
in Nicaragua or in the program areas and, unsurprisingly, did not change substantially as 58 
a result of RPS.  As shown in Table 20, 0.4 percent of children under age 5 were wasted 
in the intervention areas in 2002 and 0.2 percent in the control areas. 
Table 20￿Red de Protecci￿n Social (RPS) effect on percentage of children under 5 years 
of age who are wasted (WHZ < -2.00) 
Survey round  Intervention  Control  Difference 
Follow-up 2002  0.4  0.2  0.2 
 [479]  [557]  (0.3) 
Baseline 2000  1.0  0.3  0.6 
 [614]  [585]  (0.5) 
      
Difference 2002-2000  -0.6  -0.2  -0.4 
 (0.4)  (0.3)  (0.5) 
Source:  RPS baseline 2000 and RPS 2001 and 2002 follow-up surveys. 
Notes:  Standard errors correcting for heteroscedasticity and allowing for clustering at the comarcas level 
are shown in parentheses (StataCorp 2001); number of observations are shown in brackets.  




With no evidence of wasting, weight-for-age is best interpreted as an alternative 
indicator of chronic malnutrition.  Table 21 shows the effect of RPS on WAZ and, as 
expected, it is a pattern similar to that seen in Table 19. 
Table 21￿Red de Protecci￿n Social (RPS) effect on percentage of children under 5 years 
of age who are underweight (WAZ < -2.00) 
Survey round  Intervention  Control  Difference 
Follow-up 2002  10.4  15.8  -5.4* 
 [479]  [557]  (3.1) 
Baseline 2000  15.3  14.7  0.6 
 [614]  [585]  (2.5) 
      
Difference 2002-2000  -4.9** 1.1  -6.0** 
 (1.8)  (1.9)  (2.6) 
Source:  RPS baseline 2000 and RPS 2001 and 2002 follow-up surveys. 
Notes:  Standard errors correcting for heteroscedasticity and allowing for clustering at the comarcas level 
are shown in parentheses (StataCorp 2001); number of observations are shown in brackets.  
*** indicates significance at the 1 percent level; ** at the 5 percent level; and * at the 10 percent 
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Before RPS, 15.3 percent of the children under age 5 in the intervention areas 
were underweight for their age.  Two years later, the prevalence of underweight children 
had declined by 4.9 percentage points; at the same time, the prevalence increased by 
about 1 percentage point in the control areas.  The net effect, then, was that RPS 
significantly reduced the prevalence of underweight children by 6.0 percentage points. 
In addition to examining prevalence rates as in the previous tables, we can also 
measure program effects by considering the continuous measures of nutritional status 
upon which the prevalence rates are based.  We do this for height-for-age Z-scores in 
Table 22, finding a statistically significant net average improvement due to RPS of 0.17.  
Although the sample is not large enough to distinguish the effects among poverty groups, 
the point estimates suggest that the effects are larger than 0.20 for both the extreme poor 
and poor groups.  In two years of operation, RPS has significantly reduced stunting in 
children under age 5.
33 Because there are a variety of possible program effects through 
which child nutrition might improve￿some of which we have documented here, such as 
food expenditures and the well-child health visits￿we are careful to claim only that child  
 
Table 22￿Red de Protecci￿n Social (RPS) effect on HAZ for children under 5 years of age 
Survey round  Intervention  Control  Difference 
Follow-up 2002  -1.65  -1.80  0.14 
 (1.15)  (1.18)  (0.13) 
Baseline 2000  -1.79  -1.76  -0.02 
 (1.14)  (1.15)  (0.11) 
      
Difference 2002-2000  0.13*** -0.03  0.17** 
 (0.05)  (0.07)  (0.08) 
Source:  RPS baseline 2000 and RPS 2001 and 2002 follow-up surveys. 
Notes:  Standard errors correcting for heteroscedasticity and allowing for clustering at the comarcas level 
are shown in parentheses (StataCorp 2001).  *** indicates significance at the 1 percent level; ** at 
the 5 percent level; and * at the 10 percent level. 
                                                 
33 We have also explored differences by sex in all the nutritional status indicators, finding no statistical 
differences.  For that reason (and because of the small sample sizes), we do no present results separated by 
gender. 60 
nutrition improved as a result of the program; we do not specify the specific channels 
through which this was achieved. 
Results from the two previous national Demographic and Health Surveys (1998 
and 2001) show that Nicaragua has reduced stunting by about 1.5 percentage points per 
year over three years.  RPS, in only two years, reduced it by 5.3 percentage points, an 
annual rate of decline 1.7 times larger than the national trend.  Very few programs in the 
world have been able to rigorously demonstrate such a substantial decrease in stunting in 
such a short time. 
Iron deficiency anemia is a severe problem affecting the entire Central American 
isthmus, where it is most severe in Guatemala (nearly 50 percent), Honduras, and El 
Salvador.  In 2000, 33 percent of children ages 6￿59 months in RPS program areas 
exhibited iron deficiency anemia.  This is substantially higher than the prevalence found 
in a 1993 national survey in Nicaragua (28 percent), again likely reflecting the RPS 
targeting of poorer than (national) average areas.  One feature of the RPS VPCD was 
provision of iron supplements to children.  In Table 23, we show that the program indeed 
had a significant effect on the percentage of mother￿s receiving ferrous sulfate for their 
children in the past four months, as measured in the anthropometric survey.  The double-
difference estimated average effect was 36.1 percent in 2002. 
Table 23￿Red de Protecci￿n Social (RPS) average effect on percent of children ages 
6-to-59 months given iron supplement (ferrous sulfate) in past four months 
Survey round  Intervention  Control  Difference 
Follow-up 2002  79.8  40.1  39.7*** 
 [440]  [504]  (4.4) 
Baseline 2000  23.6  20.0  3.6 
 [573]  [541]  (5.4) 
      
Difference 2002-2000  56.2***  20.1***  36.1*** 
 (4.5)  (3.3)  (5.5) 
Source:  RPS baseline 2000 and RPS 2001 and 2002 follow-up surveys. 
Notes:  Standard errors correcting for heteroscedasticity and allowing for clustering at the comarcas level 
are shown in parentheses (StataCorp 2001); number of observations are shown in brackets.  
*** indicates significance at the 1 percent level; ** at the 5 percent level; and * at the 10 percent 
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Despite this apparent success in distributing iron supplements, after two years of 
operation, RPS had not succeeded in improving the grave situation on anemia￿the 
double-difference estimator is both insignificant and tiny in magnitude (Table 24).  
Unsurprisingly, the results for hemoglobin mirror those for anemia￿there was no 
average program effect (Table 25). 
Table 24￿Red de Protecci￿n Social (RPS) effect on percentage of children 6-to-59 months 
of age with anemia 
Survey round  Intervention  Control  Difference 
Follow-up 2002  32.8  30.9  1.9 
 [448]  [515]  (5.8) 
Baseline 2000  33.7  31.5  2.2 
 [579]  [549]  (4.0) 
      
Difference 2002-2000  -0.1  -0.6  -0.2 
 (0.5)  (0.5)  (6.8) 
Source:  RPS baseline 2000 and RPS 2001 and 2002 follow-up surveys. 
Notes:  Standard errors correcting for heteroscedasticity and allowing for clustering at the comarcas level 
are shown in parentheses (StataCorp 2001); number of observations are shown in brackets.  




Table 25￿Red de Protecci￿n Social (RPS) effect on average hemoglobin for children 
6-to-59 months of age 
Survey round  Intervention  Control  Difference 
Follow-up 2002  11.2  11.4  -0.2 
 (1.3)  (1.3)  (0.2) 
Baseline 2000  11.4  11.5  -0.1 
 (1.4)  (1.5)  (0.1) 
      
Difference 2002-2000  -0.1  -0.0  -0.1 
 (0.2)  (0.1)  (0.2) 
Source:  RPS baseline 2000 and RPS 2001 and 2002 follow-up surveys. 
Notes:  Standard errors correcting for heteroscedasticity and allowing for clustering at the comarcas level 
are shown in parentheses (StataCorp 2001).  *** indicates significance at the 1 percent level; ** at 
the 5 percent level; and * at the 10 percent level. 62 
While Table 23 showed that twice as many children in intervention areas had 
received iron supplements in the last four months compared to control areas, it is not 
possible to ascertain from these data whether complete doses were received during each 
VPCD visit, or whether the supplements were actually ingested.  Program administration 
data show that there were severe shortages of vitamins, iron supplements, and 
antiparasites during 2001, so it is likely that complete supplements were not received at 
each visit.  Unfortunately, this is something that the four-month reference period for the 
survey question on supplementation delivery would not reflect.  The estimated effect on 
provision does not appear to be telling the whole story.  Shortages and inconstant or 
incomplete delivery to children present one possible reason for the failure to improve 
hemoglobin in the population, as well as the fact that even though the program effect was 
massive, fully one-fifth of the children under age 5 in the intervention areas had not 
received a supplement in the past four months. 
Another possibility is that children are deficient in other micronutrients, 
potentially limiting the hematological response to iron supplementation.  Allen et al. 
(2000) failed to find an improvement in hemoglobin in children ages 18￿36 months 
supplemented with iron over 12 months in a controlled experiment.  They concluded that 
the failure of the treatment could not be attributed to failure to take the supplement, 
inadequate length of supplementation, or inadequate absorption of the iron provided. 
One thing that can be expected from an iron supplementation intervention is an 
increase in the reserves of iron in the human body.  Future evaluations of RPS may 
benefit from measuring changes in reserves of serum ferritin and other indicators to gain 
a more complete picture of the effect on the state of iron nutrition.  In addition, including 
iron supplementation as a theme in the health education workshops should be considered. 
5.  Conclusions 
This paper presented the main findings of a quantitative evaluation of a 
randomized community-based intervention, RPS, against its primary objectives.  Where 63 
possible, we erred on the side of assessing effect in conservative manners, for example, in 
the calculation of standard errors and treatment of possible contamination.  In many 
instances, for example when assessing the effects on expenditures during what turned out 
to be an economic downturn, the critical importance of a control group for the evaluation 
was evident￿without one it would have been next to impossible to make reliable 
assessments of the program effect.  Even with one, it was at times difficult to make 
unequivocal assessments of effects for some indicators, since the evaluation did not occur 
in a vacuum, and a variety of actors not under the control of the program continued to 
operate in program areas.  Working closely with the implementing team proved to be 
important, so that the IFPRI group was made aware of external influences that could not 
be gleaned from quantitative surveys. 
Overall, we found that RPS had positive and significant double-difference 
estimated average effects on a broad range of indicators and outcomes.  Where it did not, 
it was often due to similar, though smaller, improvements in the control group.  Nearly all 
estimated effects were larger for the extremely poor, often reflecting their lower starting 
points (e.g., percentage of children matriculating before the program).  Among poorer 
beneficiaries there was simply more potential for improvement on many of the indicators.  
As a result, the program has reduced inequality of these outcomes across expenditure 
classes.  The findings presented here played an important role in the decision by the 
Government of Nicaragua and IADB to continue this effective program. 
RPS in its pilot phase supplemented per capita annual total household 
expenditures by 18 percent, on average.  For beneficiary households, this increase 
compensated for the large income loss experienced by nonbeneficiaries during this 
period, while producing a small overall increase in expenditures.  Most of the increase in 
expenditures was spent on food; the program resulted in an average increase of C$566 in 
per capita annual food expenditures and an improvement in the diet of beneficiary 
households.  Expenditures on education also increased significantly, though there was no 
discernable effect on other types of investment expenditures.  Labor market participation 
was apparently little changed with the program, though there was an indication of slightly 64 
fewer hours worked, on average, in the last week.  The economic difficulties experienced 
by these communities enabled RPS to operate somewhat like a traditional social safety 
net, aiding households during a downturn. 
For schooling, RPS produced a massive average net increase on enrollment of 
17.7 percentage points and an even larger effect of 23.0 percentage points on current 
attendance for the target population.  Examining the number of children in Grades 1￿4 
who advanced two grades between 2000 and 2002, RPS led to an average increase of 6.5 
percentage points, despite the fact that advancement past Grade 4 was not a formal 
requirement of the program.  In tandem with the increased schooling, the percentage of 
children 7￿13 years working declined by 4.9 points. 
For child health care, RPS induced an average net increase of 11.0 percentage 
points in the participation of children under age 3 in VPCD.  At the same time, the 
services provided by the program, as measured by process indicators, including whether 
the child was weighed and whether their health card was updated, improved even more.  
Participation by children ages 3￿5 also increased substantially.  While it is not possible to 
statistically demonstrate that RPS increased vaccination coverage for children ages 12￿23 
months in the intervention group (relative to the control group), it was demonstrated that 
vaccination rates climbed over 30 percentage points in the intervention and control areas 
at a time when they were, on average, decreasing in rural areas nationally.  One would be 
hard pressed not to attribute at least some part of this substantial improvement to RPS. 
Finally, the more varied household diet and increased use of preventive health-
care services for children have been accompanied by an improvement in the nutritional 
status of beneficiary children under age 5.  The net effect was a 5-percentage point 
decline in the number of children who were stunted.  This decline is more than 1.5 times 
faster than the rate of annual improvement seen at the national level between 1998 and 
2001.  Very few programs in the world have shown such a decrease in stunting in such a 
short time.  Despite improvements in the distribution of iron supplements to these same 
children, however, RPS was unable to improve hemoglobin levels or to lower rates of 
anemia. 65 
RPS has improved a number of the indicators included in the Nicaraguan national 
poverty reduction strategy, during a time in which many of them are not on track to 
achieve the goals set out in that plan (World Bank 2003).  The preponderance of evidence 
from the evaluation suggests that if the program were expanded elsewhere in poor rural 
areas of Nicaragua, it would be equally successful.  As such, it could prove to be an 
important component of Nicaragua￿s overall poverty reduction policy.  Before expanding 
to other parts of the country, however, policymakers had to consider the costs￿was RPS 
cost-effective in achieving these outstanding results in comparison to other possible 
programs or policies? 
In a related paper, CaldØs, Coady, and Maluccio (2004) compare costs for 
PROGRESA, PRAF, and RPS.  While they fall short of actually assessing cost-
effectiveness, which is complicated by the multiple objectives of each program, they find 
that the pilot phase of RPS was the ￿most expensive￿ of the three in delivering a dollar￿s 
worth of transfer to a beneficiary household, though it still appears to have been 
reasonably cost-efficient, given its complicated design (with an involved supply-side 
component that the other two programs did not have) and its small size, particularly in 
comparison to PROGRESA.  Furthermore, RPS arguably had the most impressive 
effects.  The authors highlight the various costs associated with a number of special 
program features thought to be crucial, in particular, targeting, monitoring, and 
conditioning, all of which require resources above and beyond the transfers alone.  
Removing these costs reduces the administrative costs substantially, but it is not possible 
to determine by how much it would reduce the effectiveness of the program￿indeed, 
their removal could represent a false savings. 
Another crucial question that the current evaluation cannot answer is whether the 
changes seen here will persist after the program exits, or whether there are longer-term 
effects that have not been captured in what is only a short-term, two-year evaluation.  A 
companion qualitative study aimed in part at answering those questions, as well as 
uncovering some of the mechanisms underlying the changes seen or not seen in the 
quantitative evaluation (such as the lack of an effect on anemia), is underway at this 66 
writing.  Furthermore, RPS has recently delivered the final demand-side transfers in the 
original intervention areas, though it is scheduled to continue offering health-care 
services and teacher transfers until the end of 2005.  We will return to the field in October 
2004 to examine the effects of that transition, and begin to understand better the 
sustainability of the large changes achieved by RPS. 
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Appendix A:  Household Targeting in Geographically Targeted Areas 
After implementing a registry census in May 2000 (known as the RPS population 
census I), RPS excluded a small percentage of households who, even though they were 
verified to be living in the geographically targeted rural areas, appeared not to be 
extremely poor.  This decision was taken, in part, because the intervention areas had 
substantially more than 5,000 households￿the desired number of beneficiaries in the 
program during the first stage of the pilot phase.  Households satisfying one or both of 
the following were excluded: 
1.  Own a vehicle, truck, pickup truck, or jeep; 
2.  Own more than 20 manzanas (14.1 hectares) of land. 
Based on these criteria, 169 households (2.9 percent of the households living in 
the intervention areas as reported in the May 2000 RPS census population) were excluded 
from the program.  In addition to these households, 219 (3.8 percent) households were 
excluded after the orientation assemblies and program registration for one or more of the 
following reasons:  
1.  household comprising a single man or woman who was not disabled, 
2.  household with significant economic resources or a business, 
3.  household that omitted or falsified information during the RPS population census. 
Finally, 240 (4.2 percent) households did not attend the orientation assembly or 
chose not to participate.  Thus in the first stage of the pilot phase, the program excluded a 
total of 628 (10.9 percent) of the 5,741 rural households interviewed in the RPS 
population census of May 2000.  An additional 882 households were included as 
beneficiaries when it was discovered that the May 2000 RPS population census had 
missed 949 households in the targeted areas (these were integrated into the registry 68 
during the RPS population census II carried out in September 2000 and described in 
IFPRI (2001b).  These households were not included in the original sample frame for the 
evaluation survey and thus are not included in the evaluation.  An examination of their 
characteristics (collected in the RPS population census) shows that, on average, they tend 
to have fewer resources than the households included in the evaluation survey.  Since 
most of the program effects were larger for the less well-off, their exclusion from the 
evaluation is likely to make the average estimated effects smaller (or more conservatively 
estimated), though probably not by very much, since they represent only about 15 percent 
of households in the area. 
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Appendix B:  Table 
Table 26￿Indicators for (RPS) evaluation in Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) loan 
contract 




Percentage of children under age 3 years of age 
who participate in the growth and 
development monitoring program (VPCD) 
An increase of more than 10 percentage points in 





Percentage of children between 12 and 23 months 
of age that have received all necessary 
vaccinations according to Ministry of Health 
guidelines 
An increase of more than 10 percentage points in 




Percentage of households that have increased 
spending on food, as a fraction of the total 
household expenditures  Observe the tendency of the change 
4. 
 
Percentage of children in the first through fourth 
grades who continue in school 
An increase of more than 10 percentage points in 
the intervention group over the control group 
5. 
 
Percentage of children in the first through fourth 
grades who have matriculated in school. 
An increase of more than 8 percentage points in 
the intervention group over the control group 
6. 
 
Percentage households included in the program 
that are extremely poor  More than 70 percent 
7. 
 
Percentage of households included in the program 
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